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INTRODUCTION
Americans prize privacy, particularly from government intrusion, and
our Constitution provides fundamental privacy protections. For example,
the Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.”1 Notwithstanding these Constitutional protections, Congress
has found it necessary to authorize the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to
use mandatory measures to collect a comprehensive body of personal
financial information about each American, in order to ensure compliance
with the federal income tax.2 Increasingly, the IRS stores this information
in digital form and frequently3 shares it with other agencies of the federal
government and the states.4 Some commentators view this collection of
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See, e.g., PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE PRIVACY
PROTECTION STUDY COMM’N: THE CITIZEN AS TAXPAYER 6 (1977) [hereinafter PRIVACY
COMM’N REPORT] (stating that “[t]o fulfill the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code,
the Internal Revenue Service collects and maintains vast amounts of information about all
individual taxpayers. Congress has determined that the compelling societal need to finance
government activities warrants the intrusion into the lives of individuals that compliance
with the Internal Revenue Code inevitably entails.”); see also William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s
Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1032 (1995)
(explaining that “[t]he government needs certain kinds of information from taxpayers in
order to enforce the tax laws. It cannot require disclosure only in cases in which it has some
basis for suspecting a violation, because then it could not uncover violations”).
3. Congress’s concern about disclosures by the IRS to other government agencies is
not a recent development. The Privacy Act of 1974 directed the Privacy Commission to
examine this issue. Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5(c)(2)(B)(ii), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974). Prior to
1974, Congress had “delegated to the Executive branch substantial discretion to decide to
what extent, and under what conditions, tax returns and other information about taxpayers
would be disclosed by the Service to other government agencies.” PRIVACY COMM’N
REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. Because of certain exceptions in the Privacy Act of 1974, the
IRS did not “interpre[t] it as prohibiting disclosures of records about individuals currently
authorized by regulation.” Id. at 2-3. After a preliminary report was issued by the
Commission, Congress adopted a comprehensive amendment to the rules regarding tax
return disclosure in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
Subsequently, the Commission revised its report and stated that “[t]he Tax Reform Act of
1976 is consistent in the main with the Commission’s general recommendations.” PRIVACY
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 2, at 30; see also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG.,
STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND
REFORM ACT OF 1998, VOLUME I: STUDY OF GENERAL DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS 128 (Comm.
Print 2000) [hereinafter 2000 JCT REPORT] (providing a more recent review of these rules).
4. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing situations in which the IRS is authorized to
disclose tax return information to other government agencies). Some commentators have
proposed that certain information about specific tax returns be released publicly. See, e.g.,
Stephen W. Mazza, Tax Compliance: Should Congress Reform the 1998 Reform Act?
Taxpayer Privacy and Taxpayer Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1070, 1142 (2003)
(arguing that the IRS should be allowed to publicly release information about a taxpayer’s
“criminal tax evasion; failure to pay assessed taxes; and investments in abusive tax
shelters”); see also Marc Linder, “Tax Glasnost” for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil
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information by the IRS as an unacceptable invasion of privacy; they urge
that privacy be restored to Americans by replacing the income tax with a
“flat tax,” a form of consumption tax.5 They emphasize that, under the flat
tax,6 most taxpayers would be required to file only a postcard-sized return,
in contrast to the extensive reporting required on the current Form 1040.7
President Bush has recently announced his intention to pursue tax reform
in his second term and has appointed an advisory panel to examine various
options, including adoption of the flat tax.8 This Article seeks to contribute
to the upcoming debate by examining whether the issue of privacy should
provide a strong argument in favor of replacing the income tax with a flat
tax.
of Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
951, 959-60 (1990-1991) (recommending that the tax returns of millionaires be made public
to foster public debate about income disparities and redistribution).
5. See generally DAN MITCHELL, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INNOVATION, TAX REFORM:
THE KEY TO PRESERVING PRIVACY AND COMPETITION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 9 (2002)
(arguing that “fundamental tax reform is the solution to an invasive tax code that gives
government the right to know every detail about a taxpayer’s financial existence”),
available at http://www.ipi.org. Mitchell also states that “the reduction of government
prying is sufficient reason to scrap the Internal Revenue Code.” Id. at 2. Mitchell
concludes that “[t]ax reform is a way of returning privacy and control to the American
people.” Id. at 10; see also CATO INSTITUTE, Fundamental Tax Reform, in CATO HANDBOOK
FOR CONGRESS, 106TH CONGRESS 57, 69 (2001) (arguing that “[n]o other institution is as
great a threat to our civil liberties as the IRS. Congress has tried to transform the IRS into a
kinder, gentler agency. But the truth is that IRS abuses will assuredly continue as long as
we retain a flawed income tax system”); Stephen Moore, The Economic and Civil Liberties
Case for a National Sales Tax, 71 TAX NOTES 101, 103-04 (1996) (explaining that “without
a search warrant, the IRS has the right to search the property and financial documents of
American citizens,” and noting that in 1995, “Congress added 5,000 IRS agents even as it
was forced to acknowledge that hundreds of auditors were illegally scouring through the
returns of American citizens”). Moore argues that the retail sales tax, and not the flat tax,
would cause our tax system to be less intrusive. Id. at 104.
6. Privacy is not the only reason offered for replacing the income tax with the flat tax.
Flat tax advocates also claim that the flat tax is fairer and easier to administer than the
income tax, and that the flat tax would stimulate savings and economic growth. See, e.g.,
MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing that “the loss of privacy [under the income tax] is a
result of bad tax policy”). Opponents of the flat tax argue that the income tax is fairer and
that predictions of an improved economy and greater administrative simplicity under the flat
tax are exaggerated. See generally Stephen B. Cohen, The Vanishing Case for Flat Tax
Reform, 86 TAX NOTES 675, 690 (2000) (concluding that “[p]redictions that the flat tax
would benefit the middle and lower classes should be viewed skeptically”; “the flat tax
seems as likely to decrease as to increase savings”; and “much of the flat tax’s promised
simplification for individuals could be achieved by reforming the existing income tax”).
This Article will not attempt to resolve this controversy. Rather it is limited to the goal of
determining what role, if any, privacy concerns should play in the upcoming tax reform
debate.
7. See MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 9 (explaining that the flat tax would replace current
tax forms with two postcards—one designed for households and one for businesses).
8. Exec. Order No. 13,369, 70 Fed. Reg. 2323 (Jan. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/executive-order.shtml. See generally Martin A. Sullivan,
Economic Analysis, Waiting for Tax Reform: A Commission Report Preview, 106 TAX
NOTES 152 (2005) (predicting the recommendations of President Bush’s advisory panel);
Heidi Glenn, Bush Panel to Outline Tax Reform Options by July 31, 2005 TAX NOTES
TODAY 6-1 ¶ 12 (Jan. 10, 2005)(on file with the American University Law Review)
(describing the purview of the nine-member bipartisan panel appointed by the President).
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Part I will briefly describe the flat tax, and Part II will consider what
changes in IRS information-gathering would occur if a flat tax is adopted.
The most salient change is that, under a flat tax, the IRS would no longer
routinely collect information about dividends, interest, and capital gains
received by taxpayers. Part III will examine whether the IRS’s current
collection and use of this category of information is, in fact, as dangerous
and harmful as flat tax advocates contend. This Part also will examine
whether the flat tax would avoid any harms found to occur under the
income tax. Next this Part will analyze the difficulties that other
government agencies and units would face if the IRS no longer collected
and shared this information.
In conclusion, this Article notes that dividends, interest, and capital gains
are highly concentrated among wealthy taxpayers, so that any
improvements in privacy resulting from adoption of the flat tax would be
unevenly distributed among Americans. It also concludes that the privacy
of Americans would be better served by retention of the income tax and
renewed efforts to protect against misuse of the information that the IRS
collects.
I.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE FLAT TAX

The “flat tax,” originally proposed by Robert E. Hall and Alvin
Rabushka in 1981,9 has been the basis for legislative proposals by Senator
9. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX vii (2d ed. 1995) (reviewing
history of their flat tax proposal). See generally GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT ON THE
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE TAXES ON TAXPAYERS AND ADMINISTRATORS (1998)
[hereinafter ALTERNATIVE TAXES] (outlining the major differences in alternative tax systems
and considering the potential burdens on taxpayers and responsibilities for the government
under those alternative systems); STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG.,
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RELATING TO “FLAT” TAX RATE PROPOSALS SCHEDULED FOR A PUBLIC
HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE (Joint Comm. Print 1995) (outlining
the present structure of the income tax system and proposals for the flat tax); MICHAEL
GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 212-43 (1997) (recounting the
recent movement to reform the taxation system); Neil H. Buchanan, A User’s Guide to
Proposals to Replace the U.S. Tax System and Strangle Fiscal Policy, 33 J. ECON. ISSUES
505, 509 (1999) (suggesting that the “true agenda” of the flat tax proposal is to “shift the tax
burden downward”); Michael Calegari, Flat Taxes and Effective Tax Planning, 51 NAT’L
TAX J. 689 (1998) (describing potential tax avoidance strategies taxpayers could use under
the Hall-Rabushka plan); Marvin A. Chirelstein, The Flat Tax Proposal—Will Voters
Understand the Issues?, 2 GREEN BAG 147 (1999) (analyzing how political rhetoric creates
misunderstanding of flat tax proposals); Alan L. Feld, Living with the Flat Tax, 48 NAT’L
TAX J. 603 (1995) (arguing that a flat tax will not simplify taxation as its proponents
suggest); William G. Gale, Tax Simplification: Issues and Options, 92 TAX NOTES 1463,
1478-81 (2001) [hereinafter Gale, Tax Simplification] (discussing potential sources of
complexity under the flat tax); William G. Gale & Kevin A. Hassett, A Framework for
Evaluating the Flat Tax, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 42-37, ¶¶ 2-3 (Mar. 3, 1998) (on file with
the American University Law Review) (analyzing the Hall-Rabushka flat tax as a
consumption tax); Lawrence J. Kotlikoff, Consumption Taxation—The A,B,C’s That Every
Politician Should Know, 48 EMORY L.J. 823 (1999) (outlining the basic differences between
various types of consumption taxation systems); Jerome Kurtz, Two Cheers for the Income
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Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)10 and Senator Richard C. Shelby (R.-Ala.).11 Under
the Hall-Rabushka proposal, the Form 1040 for individuals would be
replaced with a “postcard return,” on which the taxpayer would identify
himself by name, home address, occupation and social security number.
The only two items of income reported on the return would be “wages and
salary” on line 1 and “pension and retirement benefits” on line 2. A
personal allowance (similar to a standard deduction) would be claimed
based on whether the taxpayer’s filing status is “married filing jointly,”
“single,” or “single head of household.” In addition, a smaller personal
allowance would be allowed for each dependent.12 As under the current
system, employers would continue to withhold taxes from a taxpayer’s

Tax, 27 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 161 (2001) (arguing that transition to an alternative tax system is
administratively and politically unmanageable and that the current tax system is the fairest
possible); Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Simplicity of the Flat Tax: Is It Unique?, 14 AM. J.
TAX POL’Y 283 (1997) (examining whether simplifications often associated with the flat tax
are unique to it or whether they could be found in other proposals); John K. McNulty, Flat
Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A
Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095 (2000) (arguing
against adoption of the flat tax in light of the history of income taxation in the United States
and possible modifications to the current system); Stephen Moore, The “Freedom to
Choose” Flat Tax, 97 TAX NOTES 1609 (2002) (arguing that successful adoption of the flat
tax will require a different political strategy); Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax
Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 151 (1997) (noting that the desire for equitable distribution of tax liabilities has
resulted in tax system complexity); Ronald A. Pearlman, Fresh From the River Styx: The
Achilles’ Heels of Tax Reform Proposals, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 569 (1998) (explaining the tax
avoidance and tax evasion opportunities implicit in various tax reform proposals); Julie
Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the Federal Income Tax, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 319 (2003)
(noting how the current taxation system is intertwined with American economic and cultural
life); Robert P. Strauss, Administrative and Revenue Implications of Alternative Federal
Consumption Taxes for the State and Local Sector, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 361 (1997)
(considering the effects of a federal consumption tax on local and state economies); Alvin
C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of Tax Reform, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157 (1997)
(analyzing three proposals for tax reform and comparing the current taxation system to that
of other developed nations); David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV.
599 (2000) (arguing that claims of simplicity and efficiency by flat tax proponents are not
accurate); William G. Gale, Tax Reform in the Real World, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 387 (1998)
(reviewing GRAETZ, supra) (noting that thoughtful tax reform proposals must consider the
history and politics of taxation in the United States); Grover Norquist, Step-by-Step Tax
Reform, WASH. POST, June 9, 2003, at A21 (arguing that each Bush administration tax cut
represents a movement towards fundamental tax reform).
10. Flat Tax Act of 2003, S. 907, 108th Cong. (2003).
11. Tax Simplification Act of 2003, S. 1040, 108th Cong. (2003).
12. In the 1995 Hall-Rabushka version, the figures for the basic standard deduction are
$16,500 for “married filing jointly,” $9,500 for “single,” and $14,000 for “single head of
household”; the amount for each dependent is $4,500. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 9, at
59. Under the Flat Tax Act of 2003, the basic standard deduction would be $17,500 on a
joint return, $15,000 for a head of household, and $10,000 for an unmarried individual who
is not a head of household. § 2. There would be an additional standard deduction of $5,000
for each dependent. Id. Under S. 1040, the basic standard deduction is $25,580 on a joint
return, $16,330 for a head of household, and $12,790 for an unmarried individual who is not
a head of household. Tax Simplification Act § 101. The additional standard deduction for
each dependent is $5,510. Id.
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wages.13 All income would be taxed at a single rate.14
In addition, any individual or entity engaged in the conduct of a trade or
business would be required to file a business tax form in the name of the
business.15 On this form, the taxpayer would record two items: “gross
revenue from sales” and “allowable costs.” Allowable costs would include
“purchases of goods, services and materials, wages, salaries and pensions,
and purchases of capital equipment, structures and land.”16 The wages and
pensions deducted on this business tax form would, however, be included
on the individual tax return of the employee.

II. HOW WOULD IRS INFORMATION-GATHERING CHANGE UNDER THE
FLAT TAX?
A. What Would Not Change
In order to highlight the changes in information-gathering that would
occur under the flat tax, it is useful to consider first the many aspects of
IRS information collection that would not change.
Under the flat tax, an individual would continue to file an annual
personal return showing amounts received as wages or pension
distributions, if any. The taxpayer would continue to report income from a
sole proprietorship, although this would be on a separate business return.17
An individual filing a personal return would indicate the appropriate filing
status, the number of his dependents, and their Social Security numbers.18
13. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 9, at 59, 145.
14. Id. at 52. In the 1995 Hall-Rabushka plan, this would be nineteen percent. Id. at
56. The Tax Simplification Act sets the rate at nineteen percent initially, with a subsequent
decrease to seventeen percent. Tax Simplification Act § 101. The Flat Tax Act sets the rate
at twenty percent. Flat Tax Act § 2.
15. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 9, at 61-64.
16. Id. at 62.
17. However, one could show compensation for personal services in one’s business on
the personal return in order to use the basic standard deduction and dependency exemptions.
See, e.g., Flat Tax Act § 2. Under the income tax, an individual engaged in the conduct of a
business as a sole proprietor shows the receipts and deductible expenditures of the business
on a Schedule C attached to the Form 1040.
18. It seems likely that the flat tax would incorporate, in its rules for the dependency
exemption and head of household filing status, the uniform definition of a “qualifying child”
adopted by Congress in October 2004. See Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-311, tit. II, § 201, amending I.R.C. § 152, 118 Stat. 1166, 1170 (2004) (defining
a “qualifying child” as an individual “who bears a relationship” to the taxpayer; “who has
the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of such taxable
year”; who meets certain age requirements; and “who has not provided over one-half of
such individual’s own support for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the
taxpayer begins”). Under the Working Families Tax Relief Act, the “support test” for
claiming a dependency exemption is no longer applicable with respect to a “qualifying
child” of the taxpayer; however, the child may not provide more than one-half of his own
support. § 201, 118 Stat. at 1170. A “qualifying child” must be shown to have had the
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In addition, the IRS would continue to receive a Form W-2 from anyone
employing the taxpayer as an employee, a Form 1099-MISC from any
business paying fees to the taxpayer as an independent contractor, and a
Form 1099-R from any payor of pension distributions to the taxpayer.
Under the flat tax, as with the income tax, filing a tax return would not
necessarily mark the end of information-gathering by the IRS.19 As under
current law, the IRS could be expected to demand substantiation for some
taxpayers’ claims of favorable filing status and of dependency
exemptions,20 particularly when two taxpayers take conflicting positions.21
The audit of a business return would be similar to the audit of a taxpayer’s
Schedule C under current law. The IRS would seek to determine whether
same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the taxable year. Id.
The legislation does not eliminate the requirement, for claiming head of household status,
that the taxpayer pay more than half of the cost of maintaining as a home the household that
is the principal place of abode of the taxpayer and child for the current year. Working
Families Tax Relief Act § 202, 118 Stat. at 1175.
19. Congress has given the IRS explicit authority to examine any books or records
which may be relevant to determining an individual’s tax liability, to issue a summons to the
taxpayer or other persons to produce such books or records, or to give testimony under oath
which is relevant to such a determination. I.R.C. § 7602 (2005). Federal district courts are
authorized to compel compliance with such summons and to use the contempt power toward
this end. I.R.C. § 7604 (2005); see also United States v. Powell, 279 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964)
(holding that the IRS Commissioner “need not meet any standard of probable cause to
obtain enforcement of his summons [and that h]e must show that the investigation will be
conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose,
that the information sought is not within the Commissioner’s possession, and that the
administrative steps required by the Code have been followed”). See generally Bryan T.
Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (2004) (noting that the
IRS “gathers the information it needs to determine taxes voluntarily from taxpayers and
third parties through the return system, through various information-sharing agreements
with federal and state agencies, through access to the vast public database of courthouse
records and through informal requests”). In most cases, the IRS simply requests—and
usually receives—the information it needs. Id. When a taxpayer or a third party refuses to
provide information to the IRS, it may issue a summons. Id.; see also Mazza, supra note 4,
at 1099 (explaining the IRS summons enforcement procedure). In some cases, the IRS may
elect to make an estimated assessment based on available information, ultimately forcing the
recalcitrant taxpayer to turn over the information to the Tax Court so as to avoid an adverse
decision. Camp, supra, at 32 n.147 (citing William L. Raby, TCMP, Economic Reality, and
IRS Summons Power, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 140-97 (July 19, 1995) (on file with the
American University Law Review)).
20. See William G. Gale & Janet Holtzblatt, The Role of Administrative Issues in Tax
Reform: Simplicity, Compliance and Administration, in UNITED STATES TAX REFORM IN THE
21ST CENTURY 179, 206-07 (George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieskowski eds., 2002) (noting that
determination of the number of a taxpayer’s qualified dependents would be just as difficult
under the flat tax as under the income tax).
21. To establish that a child had the same principal abode as the taxpayer for more than
half of the taxable year, the taxpayer probably would have to produce the type of proof
currently called for under Form 8836 (relating to the earned income tax credit). For
example, that proof might consist of a third party affidavit from a clergyman or of records or
a signed letter on letterhead from a child-care provider, a social service agency, doctor,
parole officer, or landlord. See I.R.S. Form 8836 and accompanying instructions (2004),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f8836
.pdf.
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business receipts were reported in full, whether expenses were
substantiated, and whether payments of personal expenses were disguised
as business inputs; the IRS would also examine payments of wages to
owners and family members.22
Additionally, if the IRS suspects the existence of significant amounts of
unreported wage income on a personal return or of business income on a
business return,23 it might well seek to develop a detailed and
comprehensive picture of a taxpayer’s financial transactions, including
consumption expenditures and investments.24 Thus, as under current law,
22. See Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 155 (stating that “borderline business expense
issues” such as whether a car is used for business or personal purposes, whether certain
travel expenses are for business or personal purposes, or whether an “alleged home office is
in fact an ‘office’ . . . would be no less contestable under the Flat Tax”); see also Lester B.
Snyder & Marianne Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the Federal Income Tax: Taking the
Tax Law “Private” Through the Flat Tax and Other Consumption Taxes, 13 AM. J. TAX
POL’Y 1, 72 n.278 (1996) (noting that “restrictions on home office and travel costs, which
attempt to filter out the personal from the business side of the self-employed person’s
expenses, would not appear to be any less complicated under the consumption tax
proposals”); Weisbach, supra note 9, at 645-49 (suggesting the need for a “small business”
exemption under a flat tax). Drawing on examples from Feld, supra note 9, Weisbach notes
that there would be “significant valuation problems” when assets (such as a room in a
personal residence) were contributed to or withdrawn from a business, and “allocation of
personal consumption and business would be difficult.” Id. He argues that the latter
problem would be more acute under the flat tax than under the current tax because “there is
a sharper distinction between businesses and individuals under the Flat Tax.” Id.; see also
Gale, Tax Simplification, supra note 9, at 1478 (“Some areas of the existing tax code are
also common to the flat tax and would prove just as difficult as ever. These include rules
regarding independent contractors versus employees, qualified dependents, tax withholding
for household help, home office deductions, taxation of the self-employed.”). Gale notes
that “the treatment of travel and food expenses might also cause problems” because
businesses would not be allowed to deduct them if they constitute a fringe benefit. Id. In
addition, “[c]onversion of business property to individual use ought to generate taxable
income for the business, but would be hard to monitor.” Id. at 1479.
23. See ALTERNATIVE TAXES, supra note 9, at 170 (noting that under the flat tax
“[i]ssues of noncompliance, such as with sole proprietors/independent contractors, now
troublesome to the IRS, would not likely change much with a flat tax, and there is nothing
apparent in this tax system that would solve the current problems with underreported or
unreported income, particularly of small businesses”). In addition, “[a]n underground
economy would seem to be able to operate in much the same way with a flat tax as with the
current system, because no obvious deterrent would seem to be available to prevent both
legal and illegal transactions from occurring outside the tax system.” Id.
24. See ROBERT E. MELDMAN & RICHARD J. SIDEMAN, FEDERAL TAXATION PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 19 (2001) (explaining indirect methods of proving income such as the
Cash T-Account Method, Net Worth Method, and Source and Application of Funds
Method); see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: MORE CRITERIA
NEEDED ON IRS’ USE OF FINANCIAL STATUS AUDIT TECHNIQUES (1997) (reviewing IRS
practices in connection with so-called “financial status” audits, which are used to search for
unreported income). The General Accounting Office estimated that during 1995 and 1996,
twenty-two percent of a total of 421,000 audits used a “financial audit status” technique. Id.
at 4. However, the technique was used in only seven percent of audits involving returns
with no business or farm income. Id. at 9. See generally Douglas Frazer, Lifestyle Audit
Aims to Uncover Tax Cheating, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 12, 1996, at 6 (stating that
taxpayers view financial status audits as government interference and it is clear that the
audits blur “the distinction between civil audits and criminal investigations”). Under the
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, use of “financial status or economic reality

BLUM OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

2/24/2006 2:41:37 PM

THE FLAT TAX

1249

the IRS might obtain a taxpayer’s bank or credit card records by way of a
third-party summons if the taxpayer did not provide them voluntarily.25
Finally, under the flat tax as under the current tax, the IRS would
continue to have the task of collecting taxes not collected by withholding or
paid with the return.26 Tax collection with respect to the business return
would be as difficult as under current law. Collection problems with
respect to the personal return would be less likely than under the Form
1040,27 but would continue to be significant.28 If collection action is
necessary, the IRS would seek extensive financial information about the
taxpayer to determine how much could realistically be paid under an
examination techniques to determine the existence of unreported income of any taxpayer” is
permitted only if “the Secretary has a reasonable indication that there is a likelihood of such
unreported income.” Pub. L. No. 105-206, §§ 3412, 3417(a), 112 Stat. 685, 751 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 7602(e) (West 2002)). Camp explains that “the open-ended nature of
these audits created significant opposition among tax practitioners, taxpayers and
politicians.” Camp, supra note 19, at 23 n.94, citing Barbara Whitaker, When the I.R.S.
Agent Peeks Under the Mattress, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1996, at F8; Stephen Moore,
Remarks of CATO Institute at IRS Restructuring Meeting, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 75-39 ¶ 14
(Apr. 18, 1997) (on file with the American University Law Review).
25. I.R.C. § 7609 (2005). This section of the Code imposes special procedures,
including notice, for a third-party summons. Id.; see also Camp, supra note 19, at 64-72
(considering the scope of the IRS’s authority, specifically with regard to obtaining records
from a taxpayer’s employer); Mazza, supra note 4, at 1100-01 (noting that “the IRS’s
expansive authority to obtain taxpayer information also extends to facts and records held by
third parties, including the taxpayer’s employer, bank, customers, and business associates”).
In United States v. Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a bank depositor “takes the risk,
in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to
the Government,” and that the obtaining of those records by the U.S. Attorney’s office by
means of a grand jury subpoena was not an “intrusion upon the depositors’ Fourth
Amendment rights.” 425 U.S. 435, 443-44 (1976). In response to that decision, Congress
enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (West 2002)). See generally Matthew N.
Kleiman, Comment, The Right to Financial Privacy Versus Computerized Law
Enforcement: A New Fight in an Old Battle, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1187-90 (1992)
(discussing Miller and Congress’s response to concerns about personal privacy violations by
the IRS). However, the Tenth Circuit has concluded that “there is no basis for saying that
[the Financial Privacy Act of 1978] overrides the summons authority contained in the
I.R.C.” United States v. MacKay, 608 F.2d 830, 834 (10th Cir. 1979).
26. See MELDMAN & SIDEMAN, supra note 24, § 14 (discussing the collection process);
see also Mazza, supra note 4, at 1127-35 (proposing that the IRS be permitted to publicize
delinquent tax accounts); Amy Hamilton, IRS Considers Privatizing Tax Collection, and a
Lot More, 98 TAX NOTES 652 (2003) (considering proposals to privatize various
administrative aspects of the IRS’s collections procedures). See generally Christina N.
Smith, Note, The Limits of Privatization: Privacy in the Context of Tax Collection, 47 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 627 (1997) (arguing against tax collection privatization proposals in the
interest of protecting personal privacy interests).
27. See ALTERNATIVE TAXES, supra note 9, at 171 (suggesting that with the elimination
of “information reports of earnings from savings and investments” and of audit issues
relating to “capital gains and itemized deductions,” there would be a decline in “matches
with taxpayer data and related audit issues and findings,” which would in turn “affect the
need for collection follow-up with individuals”).
28. An individual taxpayer may elect not to have withholding with respect to pension
distributions. In addition, withholding with respect to wages is not always adequate, and
taxes might be higher than expected if the individual’s filing status or dependency
exemptions are challenged.
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installment plan, whether it would be worthwhile to accept reduced
payment pursuant to an offer in compromise, what flows of income (such
as wages or pensions) could be garnished, and what assets could be seized,
if no agreement is reached with the taxpayer.29
B. What Would Change
Under the Hall-Rabushka proposal, expenditures made by individuals,
except pursuant to a business, would no longer yield deductions and
credits.30 Therefore, taxpayers would no longer be required to reveal on
their returns (and the IRS would not need to confirm) the amounts of
various expenditures that currently form the basis for such deductions and
credits, such as alimony, fees for child care, IRA contributions, highereducation tuition, moving expenses, charitable contributions, state and local
taxes, medical or dental expenses, interest expenses, or job-related or
investment-related expenses.
Information regarding these expenditures is often considered to be
particularly sensitive. For example, contributions to religious groups and
other charities may reveal a great deal about one’s personal beliefs and
associations. Payments for medical expenses relate to a very sensitive
aspect of our lives, our physical and mental health, and have important
implications for our personal relationships, employment, and sense of wellbeing. Nevertheless, flat tax advocates have not focused on these items in
making the argument that the flat tax would enhance our privacy. A reason
may be that, under the income tax, one arguably has a choice about whether
to claim these deductions on one’s return. More importantly, it is by no
means certain that the deduction for charitable contributions (or other
itemized deductions) would in fact be eliminated if a flat tax is enacted.31
29. See generally MELDMAN & SIDEMAN, supra note 24, § 14.
30. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 9, at 58-59 (proposing a flat tax in which
charitable deductions and mortgage interest deductions as well as dividend taxes, capital
gains taxes, and interest taxes would be eliminated).
31. See, e.g., Flat Tax Act of 2003, S. 907, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (retaining limited
deductions for home mortgage interest and charitable contributions, allowing a deduction
for interest incurred with respect to acquisition indebtedness of up to $100,000 and a
deduction of up to $2,500 for charitable contributions made in cash); Tax Simplification Act
of 2003, S. 1040, 108th Cong. (2003) (not permitting these deductions); see also Exec.
Order No. 13369, 70 Fed. Reg. 2323 (Jan. 7, 2005) (appointing a tax reform advisory panel
and specifying that the panel’s recommendations should “recogniz[e] the importance of
homeownership and charity in American society”); Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 154
(questioning whether those taxpayers who currently itemize would “really welcome”
elimination of itemized deductions under the flat tax “in exchange for [the promised]
lowered tax rate”); Gale & Hassett, supra note 9, ¶ 30 (arguing that if the flat tax is adopted,
“there will be pressure to retain each of several major deductions and possibly many minor
ones as well. The key ones include: the tax exclusion for employer-financed health
insurance; the earned income credit; the deduction for charitable contributions, tax
preferences for housing, especially, the deductibility of mortgage interest and property
taxes; and deductions for state and local income taxes.”); Kurtz, supra note 9, at 166 (stating
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Finally, these and other personal deductions could just as easily be
eliminated by reforming the current income tax system, without adopting
the flat tax.32
Instead, flat tax advocates direct attention to the fact that the flat tax
would eliminate the need for reporting33 investment income,34 primarily
interest, dividends, and capital gains.35 By contrast, under the income tax,
these items are annually reported by the taxpayer on Form 104036 and by
payers on Form 1099.37

that “I am convinced that most of the personal deductions and exclusions would reappear as
part of the Flat Tax . . . . If there exists the fortitude in our lawmakers to resist these
pleadings for relief under the Flat Tax, that same fortitude should support a serious effort to
simplify our current income tax by eliminating many or most personal deductions”).
32. See Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 154-55 (contending that “there is nothing inherent
in our present income tax that requires us to retain [the itemized] deductions even now. The
fact is that we choose to retain them despite the record-keeping burdens they entail just
because we consider that the activities they support—home-ownership, for example—are
deserving and desirable and merit a subsidy via the tax system . . . [Without adopting the flat
tax,] we could make the standard deduction universal under the income tax and consign the
personal expense deductions to the ash heap of history.”); see also McClure, supra note 9, at
286-87 (arguing that the simplification benefits offered by the flat tax are “not unique to the
flat tax”).
33. See Robert P. Strauss, Administrative and Revenue Implications of Alternative
Federal Consumption Taxes for the State and Local Sector, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 361, 41923 (1997) (discussing the impact of this change on state and local tax administration).
34. The flat tax would also eliminate the need for reporting of certain other
miscellaneous items of income (not earned in a business) that are reported under the income
tax. These include cancellation of indebtedness income, lottery and gambling winnings,
receipts from a hobby, income from treasure trove, alimony, Social Security benefits, prizes
(that are not employment-related), certain illegal receipts, such as amounts embezzled, and
damages from a lawsuit (which are reportable under the income tax when they are punitive
or are not from a personal physical injury).
35. See Mitchell, supra note 5, at 10. Other investment income not taxable under the
flat tax might include rent from investment real estate and royalties not received as part of a
business.
36. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX: PUBLICATION 17, 66, 71
(2004) (indicating that under the income tax, receipts of interest must be shown on Schedule
B to Form 1040, when taxable interest exceeds $1500, and taxable dividends of more than
$1500
must
be
shown
on
Schedule
B),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p17/index.html. Schedule B also requires an individual
taxpayer to reveal any authority over any foreign bank or securities account. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, 2004 INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULES A AND B (FORM 1040), at B-2. Capital gains
are shown on Schedule D. Publication 17, at 116.
37. See I.R.C. § 6042 (West 2002) (providing information on reporting requirements for
dividends); I.R.C. § 6045 (West 2002) (brokers); I.R.C. § 6049 (2005) (interest); see also
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE GREAT
DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 160-61 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that “[f]or types of income subject
to information reporting, and especially for those with tax withholding at the source of
payment, evasion is much less prevalent”); Gale & Holtzblatt, supra note 20, at 192-93
(discussing misreported income on individual tax returns); Camp, supra note 19, at 9-10
(explaining that the IRS “uses information returns to monitor and enforce the duty to report
all income and has become increasingly sophisticated in doing so. In 2001, for example, it
was able to verify about eighty percent of reported income through matching.”).
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III. HOW IMPORTANT ARE THE CHANGES IN TERMS OF PRIVACY?
Privacy has been defined as “a limitation of others’ access to an
individual.”38 Conversely, we see that a “loss of privacy” involves
obtaining access to an individual.39 Under the income tax, the IRS needs to
obtain routine access to information about an individual’s investment
income; under the flat tax it generally40 does not.
Lack of privacy has been linked to a wide variety of harms, including
improper interference with one’s property, actions, political associations, or
safety; unwarranted harm to one’s reputation; excessive pressure to
conform to social norms that stifles one’s creativity and autonomy; loss of
one’s dignity; and the inability to relax or concentrate.41 On the other hand,
too much privacy may interfere with appropriate accountability to others,
so one cannot simply conclude that more privacy is better than less
privacy.42 Therefore, it is necessary to look at the particular context43—the
IRS obtaining information about a taxpayer’s investments under the income
tax—and to evaluate the particular harms that this activity may entail.
38. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 346, 351 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
39. See id. at 350-51 (noting that “[a] loss of privacy occurs as others obtain
information about an individual, pay attention to him or gain access to him . . . These three
elements of secrecy, anonymity, and solitude are distinct and independent, but
interrelated”).
40. As noted above, the IRS may require access to information about investments, when
using an indirect method to determine the amount of any unreported income; it would also
need access when it must pursue collection.
41. See Gavison, supra note 38, at 363 (explaining that privacy “severs the individual’s
conduct from knowledge of that conduct by others,” and thus “prevents interference,
pressures to conform, ridicule, punishment, unfavorable decisions, and other forms of
hostile reaction”). This may have the desirable effects of promoting “learning, creativity,
and autonomy,” contributing to “mental health,” and “enhanc[ing] the capacity of
individuals to create and maintain human relations of different intensities.” Id. at 364-65.
Privacy also protects us from types of “exposure” that threaten “an individual’s dignity.” Id.
at 369. Freedom from “physical access” allows us to concentrate, relax, or maintain
intimate relations. Id. at 363. Gavison points out that privacy by contributing to “moral
autonomy” and allowing “liberty of political action” is essential to the functioning of a
democratic society. Id. at 369-70.
42. See, e.g., id. at 366 (recognizing that privacy is not always beneficial for society
when it “permit[s] individuals to escape responsibility for their actions”). Gavison suggests
that “privacy will only be desirable when the liberty of action that it promotes is itself
desirable, or at least permissible.” Id. at 366; see also Anita L. Allen, Privacy-as-Data
Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861,
872 (2000) (arguing that many public benefits require “moral accountability in the form of
personal financial disclosures”).
43. Helen Nissenbaum argues that
[W]hether a particular action is determined a violation of privacy is a function of
several different variables, including the nature of the situation, or context; the
nature of the information in relation to that context; the roles of agents receiving
information; their relationships to information subjects; on what terms the
information is shared by the subject; and the terms of further dissemination.
Helen Nissenbaum, Technology, Values and the Justice System: Privacy as Contextual
Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 155 (2004).
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A. How Is the Information Obtained?
Some of the harms associated with an individual’s loss of privacy result
from the manner in which others obtain access to the individual, as
compared to the fact of others having or misusing information about the
individual, however obtained.44
The two complementary means by which the IRS generally obtains
access to information about a taxpayer’s investment income are by the
individual reporting the information on a Form 1040, or by a payer or
broker reporting the information to the IRS on a Form 1099. These twin
reporting systems are mandatory, and thus deny a taxpayer the opportunity
to keep the information secret from the government. But these systems are
much less intrusive than if the IRS conducted a search of a taxpayer’s home
or eavesdropped on his conversations to obtain the information.
As a result, even though the reporting of information to the IRS
constitutes a loss of privacy,45 it is not the type of loss that is subject to
regulation by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.46 Professor
44. See Bernard W. Bell, Prosecuting White-Collar Crime, Theatrical Investigation:
White Collar Crime, Undercover Operations & Privacy, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 151,
151 (2002) (examining the privacy implications of “[t]hose who seek to ferret out whitecollar wrongdoing” by use of “assumed identities or confidential informants”); see also
Bernard W. Bell, Wiretapping’s Fruits, the First Amendment, and the Paradigms of Privacy
22 (Mar. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Bell, Wiretapping’s Fruits] (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the American University Law Review) (explaining that “[s]ometimes we seek to
protect privacy by forbidding particular means of intrusion that are especially destructive of
privacy”), available at http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art1.
45. Stuntz explains that the failure of the courts to use the Fourth Amendment to
invalidate IRS reporting requirements is not due to a lack of sensitivity of the information
reported. Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1032. He gives the example of the requirement on the
Form 1040 that an individual claiming a charitable deduction for property with a value
exceeding $500 must provide the name of the charity recipient on the return. Id. at 1032-33.
He notes that “[t]his information is undoubtedly private in any ordinary sense of the word,
and it more than exceeds the Fourth Amendment privacy threshold. The objects of my
charity are much more sensitive than the usual contents of my glove compartment, and the
latter are protected against unreasonable searches.” Id. at 1033.
46. See id. at 1034 (explaining that “[j]udges are not about to start invalidating
commonplace items on tax forms on Fourth Amendment grounds. Nor should they. But
explaining why not turns out to be hard, given that the system protects much weaker privacy
interests against invasion by the police.”). Stuntz argues that a number of possible
explanations for this result are inadequate. First, he rejects the argument that government
interests are stronger, or privacy interests are weaker, in the tax context than in the criminal
context. Id. at 1033, 1035. He explains that if the Tax Code were subject to judicial review
on Fourth Amendment grounds
[T]he government would typically have to defend not the tax code as a whole, but
only the particular feature that caused the relevant privacy invasion. No court
would need to choose between privacy protection and the tax code . . . for the
relevant tax . . . rules could always be recast to require less disclosure.
Id. at 1035. Further, he argues that “[w]ith respect to the mass of car searches and street
stop-and-frisks, the informational privacy interest at stake does not seem any weightier than
the taxpayer’s interest in keeping secret the objects of his charity.” Id. at 1036. He
considers the argument that privacy is less relevant in the regulatory than in the criminal
context because the regulatory context usually involves regulation of the conduct of
institutions, not individuals. Id. at 1036-38. But he notes that the argument is inadequate
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Sherry Colb explains that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by
regulatory disclosure requirements because the Fourth Amendment is
addressed not at the “right to keep information secret from the
government,” but at the right to “privacy from . . . governmental ‘personal
knowledge’ of the individual=s private life.”47 By “personal knowledge”
Colb means a person “directly perceiv[ing] a material event through the use
of one or more of her five senses.”48 Similarly, Professor Louis Michael
Seidman has commented that: “Modern Fourth Amendment law focuses
on what might be called the ‘collateral damage’ imposed by searches and
seizures rather than on informational privacy . . . . [T]he focus is . . . on
violence, disruption, and humiliation,” for example, in a search of a
house.49 Moreover, he notes: “It is one thing to fill out a form that requests
information about even the most personal details of one’s life. It is quite
another to discover after the fact that someone has been observing these
because it does not apply to the information-gathering on individual tax returns. Id. at 1038.
Stuntz also considers the argument that information-gathering by the IRS could be viewed
as less subject to “a kind of overbreadth problem” than a search of car or house. Id. at 1039.
Thus, he notes “[w]hen the police search a car, they see anything that happens to be in the
car, not just guns or drugs . . . . [But t]ax forms . . . ask only for the information the
government needs under the tax laws, not for generalized financial disclosure.” Id. Yet, he
explains that “in any across-the-board disclosure regime, most of the disclosure is about
legitimate conduct. A great many law-abiding taxpayers must disclose a great deal about
their finances in order to help catch a few frauds.” Id. at 1040. Stuntz also considers the
argument that when the IRS asks for information substantiating a charitable deduction this
can be distinguished from a search in the criminal context because “if he [the taxpayer] does
not want to share the information, he does not have to claim the deduction.” Id. But he
rejects this argument because “it requires that one treat the money as belonging to the
government, which then bestows deductions as a matter of grace on whatever conditions it
chooses.” Id.
47. Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment
“Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1666 (1998).
48. Id. (explaining that “[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, the government’s obligation to
respect individual privacy has generally amounted to a prohibition against such direct
perception of individuals’ physical or mental states, activities, conversations, and other
personal experiences that are manifestly hidden from observation, absent some justification
that would qualify a proposed inspection as ‘reasonable’”).
49. Louis Michael Seidman, Response: The Problems With Privacy’s Problem, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1079, 1086-87 (1995). He continues:
Consider, first, the search of a house . . . . Obviously, police raids can be a
terrifying experience for all involved, and the slightest miscalculation can result in
serious injury or death . . . . Consider searches on the street . . . . A typical search
requires the police to delay a suspect who is going about his business, force him to
assume a vulnerable and uncomfortable position, embarrass him before others, and
touch all parts of his body. Even if the search is less intrusive . . . the suspect may
have no way of knowing these limits while the search is progressing . . . . Wiretaps,
visual surveillance, searches of parked cars, and the like are not violent or invasive
in this sense. Once again, however, it distorts analysis to analogize the damage that
they do to the damage to informational privacy that occurs when an individual fills
out a tax form. The key difference is that these police investigative techniques
typically catch people unaware. Because they reveal things about people in
circumstances in which they do not know that they are being spied upon, these
techniques violate human dignity.
Id. at 1087-90 (emphasis added).
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personal details firsthand with a telescope aimed at one’s bedroom
window.”50
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not
protect a citizen from mandatory disclosure to the government, where the
information is needed for a legitimate government purpose,51 and where the
government has adopted adequate procedures to safeguard the
information.52 In Whalen v. Roe,53 the Court upheld the constitutionality of
a New York statute requiring doctors to provide information about
prescriptions written for certain dangerous drugs to the state health
department.54 The information, including the names of the patients, was to
be recorded by the health department in a centralized computer file, but
public disclosure was forbidden.55 The Supreme Court pointed out that
government regulation necessarily entails extensive collection of personal
information:
The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security
benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed
Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly
preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is
personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if

50. Id. at 1090; see also Daniel Yeager, Does Privacy Really Have a Problem in the
Law of Criminal Procedure?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1283, 1309 (1997) (arguing that the
“self-disclosure” required on tax returns or by subpoenas involves coercion that is
“justifiable because both entail actions by, not just against, the suspect,” that is, because of a
“participatory element”).
51. Mazza notes that “[i]f the information sought by the IRS would be incriminating,
the taxpayer may exercise his Fifth Amendment rights, but the taxpayer must assert the
claim on a document-by-document basis . . . . Moreover, the precise scope of the Fifth
Amendment protection against disclosure of information to the IRS is unclear . . . . In any
case, as a means of shielding information from the IRS, a claim of self-incrimination is of
little use to the average taxpayer simply because the taxpayer has no grounds for asserting
the privilege.” Mazza, supra note 4, at 1100.
52. See Mazza, supra note 4, at 1101 (stating that “[n]either Congress nor the courts
recognize a generalized right of privacy as a defense against submitting information relevant
to the determination of the taxpayer’s tax liability”).
53. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
54. Id. at 600 (concluding that the statute “does not, on its face, pose a sufficiently
grievous threat to either interest to establish a constitutional violation” in light of the
statutory and administrative procedures designed to avoid unwarranted disclosures of the
information).
55. Id. The patients and doctors argued that the statute “threatens to impair both their
interest in the nondisclosure of private information and also their interest in making
important decisions independently.” Id. The Court found that the disclosures of the
information to health department officials were not “meaningfully distinguishable from a
host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated with many facets of health
care.” Id. at 602. It noted that “public disclosure” would occur only if health department
employees “fail[] to maintain proper security.” Id. at 600. It had noted that “[p]ublic
disclosure of the identity of the patients is expressly prohibited by statute.” Id. at 594. See
Bell, Wiretapping’s Fruits, supra note 44, at 30 (noting that the Supreme Court in Whalen
“focused on the means of intrusion, considering collection of information by itself less
intrusive than collection and dissemination of information”).

BLUM OFFTOPRINTER

1256

2/24/2006 2:41:37 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1241

disclosed.56

Further, the Court explained that only “unwarranted disclosure of
accumulated private data—whether intentional or unintentional” or an
absence of adequate “security provisions” would “arguably” raise a
constitutional issue regarding the collection of data by the government.57
To say that there is no constitutional issue raised by the mandatory
reporting of information to the IRS on Form 1040 or 1099 (assuming
adequate protection against public disclosure) is not to say that such
reporting does not have important privacy implications or that Congress
should not take these into account in crafting the income tax laws.
However, it does suggest that one should carefully analyze the actual harms
that may result from the reporting of investment income before concluding
that abolishing such reporting would bring significant privacy benefits.
B. Who Obtains the Information and For What Purpose Is it Used?
Since 1976, the Code has provided that tax return information is
“confidential” and is to be inspected or disclosed by IRS employees only in
situations specifically authorized and under conditions designed to protect
the information.58
Nevertheless, Congress’s enactment of these
requirements does not necessarily ensure59 that they are fully enforced.60
56. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
57. Id. at 605-06. The Court said:
The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied
by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.
Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the
Constitution, nevertheless New York’s statutory scheme, and its implementing
administrative procedures, evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the
individual’s interest in privacy. We therefore need not, and do not, decide any
question which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated
private data—whether intentional or unintentional—or by a system that did not
contain comparable security provisions.
Id.
58. See I.R.C. § 6103 (2005); see also 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-58
(detailing this provision, its background, and subsequent amendments); Mazza, supra note
4, at 1086-96.
59. See Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government
Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 497 (1999) (stating that “a major potential problem of
government access to financial data is that the information may flow to unauthorized third
parties”). He notes that unauthorized persons can seek to obtain the information through a
“‘friendly’ insider or a bribable one.” Id. He also warns of the danger posed by “skilled
hackers,” and notes that the “Defense Department reports hundreds of thousands of
successful intrusions into military computers per year” although he concedes that “many of
the intrusions are undoubtedly done by teenagers and others who get access to part of the
system but do not steal any sensitive data.” Id. He concludes that “[t]he possibility of
intrusions, nonetheless, is a powerful argument against allowing unlimited government
access to sensitive personal information of any kind, including detailed financial
information.” Id.
60. See Mazza, supra note 4, at 1095 (noting that “the number of wrongful disclosure
claims each year has been relatively few given the total number of disclosures the IRS
makes on an annual basis”). He notes that, according to the Joint Committee on Taxation,
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Therefore, in analyzing the harms that might be caused by mandatory
reporting of investment income to the IRS, it is necessary to consider both
authorized and unauthorized uses and disclosures of information.61
1. Authorized use by IRS employees to determine correct amount of tax
liability and to collect tax
This Part will first consider whether the inspection of information about
a taxpayer’s investment income by a law-abiding IRS employee creates any
potential for harm to the taxpayer. Under the current tax system, there may
be very few employees who actually inspect this data in the vast majority
of cases. Increasingly, 1099 and 104062 forms are being transmitted via
computer,63 resulting in less information being viewed by human eyes. The
computer may simply match the items of investment income reported on
the Form 1040 with the items reported on Form 1099. Even if a
discrepancy is found, it might not require human intervention for a notice
to be mailed to the taxpayer. Only if the taxpayer responds with an
explanation of the discrepancy (as compared to ignoring the notice, or
paying the additional tax due) would an IRS employee actually view the
information.
An IRS employee might also scrutinize the taxpayer’s investment
income as part of an audit, even if no discrepancy is found between a
taxpayer’s Form 1040 and Form 1099.64 For example, an auditor might
focus on whether the taxpayer properly computed his basis on the sale of an
asset or whether he properly characterized his gain as capital gain.
Alternatively, the auditor might pursue a broad inquiry into a taxpayer’s
financial affairs because of a suspected omission of business income.
However, under the current system, the likelihood of any particular
individual being audited is quite low.65 Moreover, a broad audit of the
“between 1994 and 1999, the Government lost 24 unauthorized disclosure cases and won
97.” Id. at 1095-96 n.144.
61. See Mazza, supra note 4, at 1098 (stating that “privacy is a multi-faceted concept,
implicating proscriptions against intrusiveness (the extent to which the individual should be
forced to divulge information), misuse (the extent to which protections against unauthorized
use should exist), and unauthorized disclosure (the extent to which information should
remain confidential)”).
62. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, Enforcement Revenue Reaches
Record in 2004: Prepared Remarks of IRS Commissioner Mark W. Everson (Nov. 18,
2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (explaining that for the 2004 tax
year, more than half of individual taxpayers are expected to file electronically).
63. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 37, at 157 & n.50 (noting that “[e]ach year, the
IRS receives one billion information reports, most of them on magnetic tape or transmitted
electronically”).
64. The GAO has estimated that for 1992 taxpayers reported on their returns 97.7% of
their true net income from interest, 92.2% for dividends, and 92.8% for capital gains.
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 37, at 154 tbl. 5.1.
65. See Dan Horn, Tax Audits Aim More At Individuals IRS Ducking Complicated
Corporate Cases, Critics Say, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 1, 2004, at 1A (indicating that
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financial affairs of a business person is at least as likely under the flat tax
as under the income tax.66
Another situation in which the IRS might scrutinize a taxpayer’s
investments assets is if the taxpayer fails to pay an assessed tax voluntarily
and the IRS must find a source of payment. This situation would occur
under the flat tax, as well as the income tax.67
Assuming that an IRS employee does in fact scrutinize the taxpayer’s
investment income, is this harmful to the taxpayer? It is hard to imagine,
unless the taxpayer is a celebrity, that an IRS employee assigned to the
taxpayer’s case68 would take anything other than a professional interest in
the matter, even if the amount of investment income is extremely high.
The taxpayer should find assurance in the fact that the IRS employees with
access to the information are strangers, anonymous bureaucrats in
unfamiliar places, whom the taxpayers do not expect to see or deal with in
any other role or context and who can be expected to have no particular
interest69 in knowing any of the details of the taxpayer’s life (except to
carry out the employee’s duties).70 In fact, IRS employees are specifically
barred from examining a tax return “if a relationship impairs impartiality.”
71

the individual audit rate is 0.65%).
66. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing problems that would not
be solved even if flat tax were implemented).
67. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (comparing the current collection
process to the flat tax collection process).
68. See infra notes 122-125 and accompanying text (discussing “browsing” of a
taxpayer’s records by an IRS employee not assigned to the case).
69. See ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31-32 (New York 1967) (describing
“anonymity” as the “third state of privacy@ after “solitude” and “intimacy”). The author
explains that
[A]nonymity . . . occurs when the individual is in public places or performing
public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom from identification and
surveillance. . . . he is among people and knows that he is being observed; but
unless he is a well-known celebrity, he does not expect to be personally identified
and held to the full rules of behavior and role that would operate if he were known
to those observing him. . . . the individual can express himself freely [to a stranger]
because he knows the stranger will not continue in his life and . . . is able to exert
no authority or restraint over the individual.
Id.
70. See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1041 (discussing the lack of necessity to consider
privacy issues seriously in regulatory matters). The author notes:
One might plausibly say that telling the IRS who receives my charitable
contributions does not really intrude on my privacy very much. After all, my
friends and neighbors and co-workers do not know; the only people who have the
information are a few government employees who have no contact with me, do not
know or care who I am, and are under strict orders not to spread the information
around.
Id.
71. The IRS’s Internal Revenue Manual states that “[a] conflict of interest exists if an
examiner=s personal relationship(s) or private interest (usually of a financial or economic
nature) conflict, or raise a reasonable question of conflict with the examiner’s public duties
and responsibilities.”
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL
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Most people can imagine that there might be some secrets about a
taxpayer that are so sensitive that he would feel embarrassed, humiliated, or
unhappy if any bureaucrat (however distant and anonymous) were to have
access to them. A secret of this type might be the fact that the taxpayer’s
father was a serial killer or that he has a venereal disease or male breast
cancer.72 However, no conceivable information about one’s investment
income seems to fit into this category. This may be because an investment,
by its very nature, requires merely a passive involvement from the investor
(as compared to one’s more active involvement with a business activity or
employment). Therefore, an investment does not relate directly to one’s
personal identity.73
On the other hand, one may feel that the amount of one’s personal
wealth is an important part of one’s identity.74 Generally, only lack of
wealth, not wealth, is viewed as humiliating or embarrassing.75
Furthermore, it would seem very odd for Congress to eliminate taxation of
investment income to protect the sensibilities of taxpayers who would
otherwise have to reveal to the IRS their relative lack of wealth.
If the taxpayer is publicly known as a savvy investor (such as Peter
Lynch, Louis Rukeyser, or Warren Buffet), the IRS official might take
some interest in the particular investments held by the taxpayer. But, if the
4.10.2.2.3, ¶ 1 (May 14, 1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/
part4/ch10s02.html#d0e132491. Further, it states that “[p]ersonal relationships can include
family members, friends, and associates.” Id. at ¶ 1A.
72. See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY ISN’T EVERYTHING: FEMINIST
REFLECTIONS ON PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 117 (2003) (discussing various reasons for
seeking privacy regarding an individual’s health status). Allen notes that, among other
things, “[t]he discovery of health problems may cause anxiety and emotion. Unfortunately,
for some, illness leads to shame, embarrassment, and defeat that lower self-esteem and
increase feelings of vulnerability. Hoping to manage common forms of psychological
distress brought on by health concerns, a person may choose secrecy.” Id. at 118. She also
notes that “encounters with health providers require . . . [that] informational and physical
privacy must be sacrificed.” Id. at 126. She notes that “[d]octors are not robots, but human
beings with religious perspectives and social agendas that can openly clash with those of
their patients.” Id. She concludes that “the confidentiality promise and professional manner
of health care providers make the sacrifice tolerable, but without completely eliminating all
of the vulnerability and low self-esteem many patients feel.” Id. at 127.
73. See Linder, supra note 4, at 973-74 (stating that “[i]f the ethical, cognitive, and
moral developmental underpinnings of personhood are made the focus of a right to privacy,
then it becomes very difficult to apply a protective shield to such mundane material matters
as income”).
74. See id. at 971 (stating that “in the United States a person’s income level plays a
crucial part in determining ‘worth,’ that is, others’ estimation of her economic, social, and
moral value as a human being, and in turn shapes her self-worth and self-image”). The
author explains that his article “challenges the underlying reality and desirability of this set
of interlocking assumptions.” Id.
75. See id. at 971 n.131 (citing The Internal Revenue Law—Telling Other People’s
Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1864, § 1, at 4). During the Civil War, income tax returns
were subject to public inspection, and Marc Linder recounts that a New York Times editorial
stated that “many people with small incomes made no tax return in order to avoid ‘sneers.’”
Id.
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taxpayer is famous in any other way (e.g., as a movie star), there likely
would be little interest in the details of that taxpayer’s investments,
although there might be some titillation value in the amount of investment
income (as an indication of wealth).76 Assuming (for the time being) that
the IRS employee is conscientiously carrying out his responsibilities and
not using the information for any other purpose or disclosing it to others, it
is hard to see a serious harm, even to the celebrity taxpayer. Moreover, it is
not at all clear that the tax law should be crafted with particular concern for
the financial privacy of celebrities.
In conclusion, unless a taxpayer is seeking to avoid tax liability with
respect to investment income, the mere fact that IRS employees may be
reviewing information about the taxpayer’s investment income as shown on
a 1040 or 1099 form does not in itself represent a serious harm.77
2.

Unauthorized uses by IRS employees or others
It is, of course, possible that IRS employees will inspect or disclose data
without proper authorization, either because they are corrupt or negligent,
or because the IRS culture does not put sufficient emphasis on
confidentiality.78 Breaches of confidentiality may also occur when
information is in the hands of persons outside of the IRS to whom
disclosure was authorized.79 Furthermore, it is conceivable that persons not
employed by the IRS will gain unauthorized access to IRS data due to
76. One would expect that the IRS employee would be more interested in the
celebrity’s family situation (e.g., whether one spouse was disclaiming knowledge of
underreporting by the other spouse or how many months an ex-spouse lived in the house).
77. In a number of cases addressing the constitutionality of mandatory financial
disclosure for public officials, the courts have stressed the much greater intrusion of public
disclosure as opposed to disclosure merely to government officials. See, e.g., Barry v. City
of N.Y., 712 F.2d 1554, 1565 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding a law requiring that various city
officials file annual information reports with the City Clerk and providing for public
inspection). The court noted that “the degree of intrusion stemming from public exposure of
the details of a person’s life is exponentially greater than exposure to government officials.”
Id. at 1561 (quoting Slevin v. City of N.Y., 551 F. Supp. 917, 934 (D.C.N.Y. 1982)).
78. See Mazza, supra note 4, at 1102 (noting that “[w]ith so much taxpayer information
at the IRS’s disposal, individualized cases of misuse and inadvertent leakage of tax return
information outside the agency seem inevitable”).
79. See Memorandum from Gordon C. Milbourn, III, Acting Deputy Inspector General
for Audit, Dep’t. of Treasury, to Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 19, 2002), in DEP’T. OF
TREASURY, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO PREVENT THE POTENTIAL DISCLOSURE OF
CONFIDENTIAL TAXPAYER INFORMATION (2002) [hereinafter IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED]
(concluding that “the IRS . . . has established procedures to help ensure third parties, such as
government agencies and private contractors, [receiving tax information from the IRS]
safeguard taxpayer information,” and “the IRS conducts on-site safeguard reviews of the
agencies receiving taxpayer information every 3 years, as required”). Milbourn notes that
“a review of the IRS’ disclosure procedures and a judgmental sample of IRS agreements
with federal and state agencies and private contractors . . . indicated that the IRS needs to
make improvements to its safeguard processes and procedures.” Id. at 10. One of the
specific conclusions of the report was that “[t]he IRS does not have adequate staffing to
effectively implement all the safeguard procedures required by I.R.C. section 6103” in that
“[t]he IRS’ Headquarters Safeguard Office has a staff of 8 employees.” Id.
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inadequate security of the IRS offices or computers.
What are the potential consequences of these unauthorized acts for
taxpayers and what is the likelihood of these consequences occurring?80
a.

Use to perpetrate theft of assets, credit, or investment strategy

Theft of one’s property is obviously a serious harm from which
individuals universally desire protection. Therefore, it is important to
consider whether information obtained by the IRS about a taxpayer’s
investments creates significant opportunities for theft.81 Under the current
income tax, the IRS has information about each of the taxpayer’s financial
or securities accounts, as well as the account numbers. This information,
though, is not sufficient to permit a criminal to withdraw funds from an
account. The criminal would also need the taxpayer’s passwords, which
the IRS would not possess. Thus, even assuming that IRS data falls into
the hands of a corrupt employee, or a criminal hacking into its computer
system, a taxpayer’s accounts should be safe.
On the other hand, information about a taxpayer’s financial accounts,
even without the passwords, might be valuable to a creditor who is unable
to track down a taxpayer’s assets. With this information, the creditor could
use legal proceedings to seize the assets. Therefore, it is possible that a
corrupt IRS employee or a computer hacker could seek to profit by selling
this information to creditors. The likelihood of this actually occurring is
slim, though, because (1) assets hidden from creditors are often hidden
from the IRS and (2) the assets might be held in such a form (e.g., in an
asset protection trust) that creditors would not be able to use the legal
system to seize them. If a creditor was actually able to utilize the
information collected by the IRS to obtain payment of debt, the only harm
would be that the IRS had not lived up to its obligation to protect the
80. It is dangerous to use anecdotal evidence for this purpose. See Leandra Lederman,
Of Taxpayer Rights, Wrongs, and a Proposed Remedy, 87 TAX NOTES 1133, 1133, 1136
(2000) (noting that “[t]wo of the existing taxpayer bills of rights were prompted by
anecdotal evidence of Internal Revenue Service ‘horror stories,’” and urging “caution” with
respect to “wholesale acceptance of taxpayer horror stories”). Lederman notes that many
elements of a story told about an IRS raid by John Colaprete at Senate hearings were later
corrected. Id. at 1136. Lederman explains that a 1999 report of the General Accounting
Office “failed to substantiate various allegations of taxpayer abuse and IRS employee
misconduct.” Id.
81. See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 24
(1989) (explaining that “secrecy is invoked to protect what one owns. We take for granted
the legitimacy of hiding silver from burglars and personal documents from snoopers and
busybodies . . . [H]ad we no belongings whatsoever, our identity and our capacity to plan
would be threatened”); see also Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV.
393, 400-01 (1978) (explaining that people “conceal an unexpectedly high income in order
(1) to avoid the attention of tax collectors, kidnappers, and thieves, (2) to fend off
solicitations from charities and family members, and (3) to preserve a reputation for
generosity that might be demolished if others knew the precise fraction of their income that
they give away”).
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confidentiality of tax return information;82 the fact that the taxpayer was
required to repay a debt that he was already obligated to pay is not in itself
harmful from the societal perspective.
Collection of investment information by the IRS under the income tax
does not increase the likelihood of identity theft. Identity theft occurs when
a criminal steals information that an individual uses as identification for
financial purposes (e.g., his name, address, Social Security number,
mother’s maiden name), and uses it to obtain credit in the individual’s
name.83 The same type of identifying information used by the IRS under
the income tax (name, address and Social Security number) would also be
used by the IRS under the flat tax. Therefore, there is no greater protection
from identity theft under the flat tax. Moreover, there is no reason to
believe that under the current tax system, the IRS has been an important
source of that information for those perpetrating identity theft.84
82. This might have implications for a taxpayer’s willingness to voluntarily provide
information to the IRS. See 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that the policy of
confidentiality in section 6103 “is based on persons’ right to privacy, as well as the view
that voluntary compliance will be increased if taxpayers know that the information they
provide to the government will not become public”); see also id. at 128 (stating that
“[p]rivacy advocates argue that a taxpayer is more willing to comply with the tax laws if he
or she knows the information will be treated as confidential”). But cf. Mazza, supra note 4,
at 1070-73 (arguing that there is little direct evidence linking confidentiality and
compliance).
83. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem,
80 TEX. L. REV. 89 (2001) (discussing identity theft); see also 2000 JCT REPORT, supra
note 3, at 128 (stating that if tax return information “were publicly available . . . [t]he
available information, which could include names, addresses, social security numbers and
financial holdings, could be used to establish credit fraudulently and run up debts in the
taxpayer’s name”) (citing GREGORY D. KUTZ, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE: RESULTS OF FISCAL YEAR 1998 FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT 8, 11
(1999); Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS Updates the ‘Dirty Dozen’ for 2003:
Agency Warns of 12 Common Scams (Feb. 19, 2003) (on file with the American University
Law Review) (warning taxpayers that tax return preparers may use information such as
Social Security numbers and financial information to commit identity theft)).
84. See, e.g., SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION—IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY
REPORT (Sept. 2003) (not mentioning IRS in particular as a source of personal information
for identity thieves), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synova
tereport.pdf. This survey found that thirty-four percent of those victims whose personal
information had been misused to open new credit accounts or take out new loans were
aware of the thief’s identity; fifty-two percent of those who knew the thief’s identity
identified a family member or relative as the perpetrator, while thirteen percent identified
the perpetrator as an employee or a company or financial institution that had access to the
victim’s personal information. Id.; see also Identity Theft: How It Happens, Its Impact on
Victims, and Legislative Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Technology,
Terrorism, and Government Information of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(2000) (written testimony of Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse)
(discussing various “methods used by identity thieves to obtain identifying information
about their victims” but not mentioning leakage from IRS files), available at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/id_theft.htm. Recently a guilty plea was obtained in one of
the most alarming cases of identity theft in U.S. history in terms of the number of victims
(approximately 30,000), and the extent of their losses, which exceeded $50 million. Julia
Preston, Man Admits Role in Ring That Stole Credit Identities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2004,
at B7. The person pleading guilty had been employed by Teledata Communications, which
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Information held by the IRS about a taxpayer’s investments may be
considered valuable when it reveals the taxpayer’s investment insights and
strategies. A corrupt IRS employee or computer hacker might somehow
seek to take advantage of this information in making personal
investments,85 but this does not seem to be a serious concern. Much of this
information is already freely available as the SEC requires disclosure by
investors buying more than five percent of a company.86 More importantly,
the wisdom of using this type of information is highly questionable, as
illustrated by a recent case where many small investors lost large amounts
after buying a stock that had been known to be purchased by Peter Lynch.87
b.

Use for targeting the wealthy

Under the current system, the IRS has access to more information about
the wealth of each taxpayer than under a flat tax.88 If the fact that a
taxpayer is particularly wealthy falls into the hands of criminals (either
through a corrupt IRS employee or other leakage of the information), this
might result in the individual becoming a target for certain crimes. For
example, criminals could use the information to target wealthy individuals
for kidnapping89 with a view towards collecting ransom.90 However, while
provides services to connect businesses to large credit bureaus via computer. Id. The
employee had access to confidential access codes that enabled him to review the financial
records of credit bureaus, “including bank accounts, credit cards and loans.” Id.
85. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 59, at 493. Peter Swire, former Chief Counselor for
Privacy in the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, suggests the following possibilities:
“Access to detailed financial records might reveal confidential business information or
otherwise give officials an advantage in choosing their own investments.” Id. Swire notes
that “officials might benefit financially by sharing data with outside parties, who might pay
an official for the data and then use the data for their own purposes.” Id. at 494. He also
points out that “[s]haring data with outside parties might also open up investments for
officials that they could not otherwise afford. For instance, if confidential data revealed that
a piece of expensive property would soon rise in value, then an official might join up with
other ‘investors’ to purchase the property.” Id.
86. See Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West 2002) (detailing the
information reporting required of persons who acquire over five percent of certain classes of
securities).
87. See Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Hard Lesson: Copying Peter Lynch, Investors Bought a
Stock, Watched It Tank; Fund Star Reported a Stake in Tiny Firm, Which SEC Now Calls
Fraud-Ridden, Big Buys Get Chance to Recoup, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2004, at 1A (noting
that “[t]he case shows how badly things can go wrong as small investors try to ape the
moves of celebrity stock-pickers”).
88. See infra note 152 and accompanying text (suggesting that if the government has
less information about an individual, as it would under a flat tax, there is less risk of the
government mishandling that information).
89. In the 1930s, when Congress adopted and then immediately repealed the so-called
pink slip system for disclosing tax return information to the public, opponents argued that it
would contribute to kidnapping. See Mazza, supra note 4, at 1089 (pointing out that
opponents of the so-called “pink slip” tax disclosure provision in the Revenue Act of 1934
“warned that releasing the information to the public would facilitate blackmail, kidnapping,
and related crimes”); see also 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 254 (noting that public
opposition to the “pink slip” provision was partially driven by the view that “the slips would
only be of use to a person’s competitors, the ‘malicious and idle curious,’ kidnappers, and
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kidnapping is epidemic in some countries,91 kidnapping for ransom has not
been a significant problem in the United States.92 Moreover, there seem to
be many easier ways to discover wealthy targets for kidnapping, such as
SEC documents published online, the Forbes 500 list, and newspaper
business pages.
Information that an individual is wealthy could also be leaked to those
making commercial solicitations, such as purveyors of luxury goods or
investment managers. Furthermore, the information could be used by
charities or political organizations in an effort to find people capable of
making large donations. Even if the solicitations were legitimate, they
could constitute a nuisance for the individual. Moreover, some of these
solicitations could be made by scam artists, rather than by legitimate
businesses or charities. Some of the individuals targeted might not
otherwise be easily identifiable as wealthy because of their modest life
style.93
blackmailers”); OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
SCOPE AND USE OF TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS 19 (Oct.
2000) [hereinafter 2000 TREASURY REPORT] (stating that repeal of the pink slip provision
was “[f]ueled by images of kidnappers sifting through pink slips looking for worthwhile
victims”), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/confide.pdf.
90. Cf. MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 15 (asserting that financial privacy makes it more
difficult for criminals to select potential victims). Mitchell further notes that “[m]any
citizens, particularly those from the developing world, want confidentiality so they are less
likely to be targeted for kidnapping and other violent crimes.” Id.
91. See Fear of Captivity, THE ECONOMIST, June 19, 2004, at 54 (citing a New York
security consultant’s estimate that in 2003 there were approximately 4,000 kidnappings in
Colombia, 3,000 in Mexico and 2,000 in Argentina, and expressing skepticism that lower
figures provided by government bodies are correct); V. Groginsky, Crime as Threat; The
Rising Tide of Latin Crime Reaches the Level of a Regional Security Threat, DEF. &
FOREIGN AFFAIRS’ STRATEGIC POLICY, Jan. 2004, at 4 (noting that Colombia leads the world
in kidnappings, much of it commercially-motivated and perpetrated by guerilla and paramilitary groups, and criminal gangs); Niko Price, A New Type of Kidnapper Terrorizes Latin
America; Brutal Crime Wave Overwhelms Region, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2004, at A20,
(noting that according to a business risk consultancy, Latin America accounts for seventyfive percent of all kidnappings in the world); Niko Price, Spotlight on Kidnap and Ransom,
INT’L MONEY MKTG., Sept. 9, 2004, at 32 (stating that commercial kidnapping is a
“significant threat in Latin America, the Asia Pacific region, the former Soviet Union,
Africa, the Middle East, India, Pakistan and Eastern Europe”); Melanie Simpson-Mills,
Welcome To Mexico City—The New Kidnap Capital of the World, INDEP. (London), Sept. 5,
2004, at 19 [hereinafter Welcome to Mexico City] (noting that in Mexico City, each day an
average of four people are kidnapped and approximately seventy people are victims of
“express kidnappings,” in which victims are driven to an ATM and forced to withdraw cash
before they are released).
92. See Halcyon Ellis, Vanishing Point, WASH. POST MAG., May 6, 2004, at 10
(analyzing the kidnap and ransom insurance market and noting that compared to other
“global hotspots” for kidnappings, the several kidnap and ransom cases in the United States
usually result in the rapid arrest of kidnappers, thanks to the high quality of domestic law
enforcement). In contrast, in a kidnapping hotspot such as Mexico City, “police corruption
is not just a matter of taking bribes to turn a blind eye but of policemen who are active
kidnappers.” Simpson-Mills, supra note 91, at 18.
93. See THOMAS J. STANLEY & WILLIAM D. DANKO, THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR 7
(1996) (asserting that “most people who are not wealthy . . . think millionaires own
expensive clothes, watches, and other status artifacts. We have found this is not the case”).
ON
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Again, it is by no means clear that a leak, or other unauthorized
disclosure, from the IRS is a common means for businesses or other
organizations to identify wealthy targets for their legal or illegal
solicitations. In many cases, data about one’s financial accounts is more
easily available as a result of leakage from databases of financial
institutions.94
c.

Use of information to exercise government power against political
enemies and other disfavored groups

Professor Peter Swire offers the example of “Nazi insistence in the 1930s
that Jews give detailed reports of their financial assets” to show “how
personal data can be used to discriminate against individuals and groups.”95
He explains that “the Nazis then used these reports as part of a systematic
program to seize Jewish assets.”96 This example may lead one to wonder
whether the IRS’s collection of information about a taxpayer=s investments
may facilitate the IRS’s illegal seizure of the taxpayer’s assets for corrupt
purposes or to harass a political enemy. However, there is little evidence
that the IRS has engaged in patently illegal seizures of assets (based on
concocted tax liabilities). If such an IRS action did occur, the taxpayer
should be able to obtain judicial review. If the judiciary refused to
invalidate the action or if judicial orders were ignored by the agency, it
94. See, e.g., Bruce Mohl, Forget Your Bank Balance? It’s Available On the Internet,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2004, at D1 (reporting how I.C.U., an online asset search firm, was
able to determine, with only minor mistakes, the bank, checking account number and current
balance of Eric F. Bourassa, a privacy advocate who had authorized the search). Bourassa
discussed three ways in which the information may have leaked out: (1) I.C.U. called the
bank and illegally impersonated him; (2) the bank sold or shared his information with
I.C.U.; or (3) the bank shared the information with a third party, which then released it to
I.C.U. Id. According to the Boston Globe, I.C.U. claimed that it “complies with the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which prohibits the use of false pretenses to obtain consumers=
personal financial information,” and that “there are a number of legal ways to get the same
information, including going through a subject’s trash to obtain bank and brokerage
statements[,] spying on a subject to get a bank account or debit card number, obtaining the
subject’s credit report, or culling bank account information from credit applications filed
with auto dealerships or department stores.” Id.; see also George Guttman, The
Confidentiality Statute Needs Rethinking, 86 TAX NOTES 318, 322 (2000) (noting that
“[m]ore and more of the income data reported on tax returns is becoming available
commercially in the new information age”); Winnie Hu, Chase Bank Agrees to Stop Sharing
Data; A Pledge of Protection for Consumer Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000, at B1
(describing how Chase Bank allegedly violated its own privacy policy by sharing financial
information about eighteen million customers with four marketing companies in return for a
commission on sales of those companies’ products); Robert O’Harrow, Jr., For Sale on the
Web: Your Financial Secrets; Bank Accounts Vulnerable to Data Brokers, WASH. POST,
June 11, 1998, at A1 (describing how information brokers often keep calling banks and
posing as customers until someone provides them with the information they are requesting).
95. Swire, supra note 59, at 495.
96. Id. Professor Swire further suggests that “more subtly, officials might use control
over detailed financial information to favor or disfavor groups in the release of sensitive
political data, the administration of regulatory programs, the award of government contracts,
or otherwise.” Id.
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would be a sign that our system of government was no longer
functioning.97 It would not seem practical to craft our income tax system
with a view to warding off dangers that might occur under such extreme
circumstances.98
There are other ways that the IRS’s control over information relating to
the taxpayer could be misused for political purposes.99 One of the articles
of impeachment against President Nixon in 1974 contained the allegation
that Nixon “endeavored to obtain from the [IRS] . . . confidential
information contained in income tax returns for purposes not authorized by
law, and to cause . . . income tax audits and other income tax investigations
to be initiated or conducted in a discriminatory manner.”100 One concern is
that the IRS (perhaps under the direction of the White House) could leak
information about the taxpayer to the press or to the public in such a way as
to embarrass or discredit a political enemy of the administration.101 In
another scenario, the IRS or the White House could intimidate the taxpayer
97. A contrary example is the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans by the
U.S. government during World War II. The government used data provided by the U.S.
Census Bureau to help locate Japanese Americans for this purpose. See William Seltzer &
Margo Anderson, The Dark Side of Numbers: The Role of Population Data Systems in
Human Rights Abuses, 68 SOC. RES. 481, 492 (2001) (stating that there is a general
agreement that the Census Bureau’s “provision of mesodata and professional expertise
violated the spirit . . . [of] the census confidentiality laws” and noting that the Census
Bureau has denied that it released microdata about Japanese Americans during World War
II); see also PRIVACILLA.ORG, ASSESSING THREATS TO PRIVACY: THE GOVERNMENT
SECTOR—GREATEST
MENACE
TO
PRIVACY
BY
FAR,
at
http://www.privacilla.org/releases/Threats_to_Privacy.pdf (Sept. 2000) (on file with the
American University Law Review). Although the U.S. Supreme Court failed to invalidate
the government’s actions during the World War II period, Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 217-28 (1944), most people have not concluded that this is a strong reason for the
Census Bureau to discontinue its collection of data about ethnic origin. See, e.g., Seltzer &
Anderson, supra, at 507 (noting that numbers themselves are “morally neutral” and that it is
what we do with numbers and data that must be monitored).
98. But cf. Swire, supra note 59, at 507 (stating that “[i]n our most pessimistic
moments, we might even contemplate how tracking of all financial transactions, perhaps
combined with other forms of high-tech surveillance, might contribute to an increased risk
of tyranny in our society”).
99. Professor Swire explains the dangers as follows:
The patterns of misuse for political gain track those for financial gain. First, the
officials might use the data in their political dealings. The data may be an
inexpensive and effective form of opposition research, and give officials inside
information to make them more effective in achieving their political goals. Second,
officials might use the inside information to extract concessions from the targets of
surveillance, the way that J. Edgar Hoover apparently used secret files to protect
his tenure in office and to influence policy debates. Third, officials might benefit
politically by sharing the data with friendly outside parties. In wiretap scandals
involving the Los Angeles police in the early 1980s, the police allegedly leaked
confidential data to allies in right-wing political groups.
Id. at 494.
100. IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON[,] PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
DOC. NO. 93-339, at 3 (1974).
101. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (providing examples of executive branch
officials revealing confidential tax information about political enemies to allies or the news
media in order to gain political advantage).
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by threatening to disclose this information without actually doing so. In the
past, tax return information has been obtained by the White House102 and
leaks have occurred.103 However, after Watergate, Congress enacted
greater restrictions on White House access to tax return information104 and
102. See REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 94-266, at 96871 (1975) (describing requests for tax data by the White House beginning in the 1950s).
The Senate report provides a summary of specific instances, uncovered from Watergaterelated testimony, in which tax information was provided to the White House. Id. at 1119
n.566; see also 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 89, at 21 (stating that “[t]he Watergate
Committee’s hearings revealed that former White House counsel John Dean had sought
political information on so-called “enemies” from the IRS [and] the White House actually
was supplied information on IRS investigations of Howard Hughes and Charles Rebozo.
The Committee noted that tax information and income tax audits were commonly requested
by White House staff and supplied by IRS personnel”).
103. See John Berlau, JFK Used Audits to Silence his Critics, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS,
Sept. 29, 2003, at 21 (noting an admission by Ben Bradlee of the Washington Post that
President Kennedy had shared tax return information about billionaires J. Paul Getty and
H.L. Hunt with him). In 1970, H.R. Haldeman, White House Chief of Staff for President
Nixon, leaked to a news columnist a confidential IRS report indicating that it was
investigating George Wallace and his brother. DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF:
POWER, POLITICS, AND THE IRS 250 (1989). The columnist published the information
several weeks before Wallace was to run in an Alabama gubernatorial primary. Id.
Burnham also describes how a mid-level IRS official suggested to a Life magazine reporter
in 1968 that he investigate the association between Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas and
his former client, Wolfson. Id. at 247-48. The reporter’s work revealed that Fortas, while a
Supreme Court Justice, had received a $20,000 fee from the Wolfson Foundation, at a time
when Wolfson was appealing a securities law conviction in a U.S. court of appeals. Id. at
248. It is not clear exactly what motivated the IRS official to leak this information but it
resulted in Fortas’ resignation and gave Nixon an opportunity to alter the Supreme Court’s
makeup. Id. at 248-49. Burnham also describes how John Ehrlichman, a Nixon White
House official, requested that the IRS conduct an interview of Lawrence O’Brien, then
chairman of the Democratic National Committee, in 1972. Id. at 250. The IRS conducted
the interview in violation of its own policy regarding the questioning of political figures in
an election year, but it concluded that no further investigation was necessary. Id. at 250-51.
Ehrlichman then attempted to leak to the press a claim that O’Brien had unreported income.
Id. at 251. For additional details about this incident, see Lawrence F. O’Brien III, Burnham
Omitted Nixon Incident on IRS Tampering, 46 TAX NOTES 1198, 1198 (1990). O’Brien’s
son explains that Burnham’s book did not mention a memo written by Nixon to H.R.
Haldeman which instructed Haldeman to personally push the highest-level IRS officials to
conduct an audit of O’Brien for political purposes. Id. Finally, Burnham describes how
some IRS officials leaked information to Bob Woodward in 1975, accusing Senator Joseph
Montoya of having used his role as the chairman of a Senate subcommittee that set the
IRS’s funding to influence IRS Commissioner Alexander to stop an IRS investigation of
Senator Montoya. BURNHAM, supra, at 300-02. Although it was unclear whether the leak
was made in an effort to harm Senator Montoya or Commissioner Alexander, in fact,
Senator Montoya lost his bid for re-election one year later. Id. at 302.
104. See 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 127 (noting that prior to 1976, “executive
orders and regulations approved by the President controlled access to” information on
income tax returns). In response to the abuses of Watergate, the Tax Reform Act of 1976
eliminated “the President’s ability to control the dissemination of returns and return
information” by amending section 6103 to make “returns and return information
confidential, only to be disclosed as authorized by statute.” Id. at 127-28. Section 6103 of
the Internal Revenue Code requires that requests by the White House for taxpayer
information must be signed by the president personally and requires the president to make a
quarterly report to the Joint Committee on Taxation regarding any returns that the president
requested and the reasons for reviewing those returns. I.R.C. § 6103(g)(1), (5) (West 2002).
Mazza notes that this provision guards against “politically motivated misuse of return
TO THE
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Moreover, any such leaks would not
unauthorized disclosures.105
necessarily pertain to a taxpayer’s investment assets. For example, the IRS
might leak information about a taxpayer’s failure to pay or to report his
taxes accurately or about the ensuing investigation.106 The IRS might also
leak information about a taxpayer’s consulting fees, business-related
activities, or dependents. Therefore, the opportunity for abuse would not
be significantly different under the flat tax.
Another type of abuse of power occurs when the IRS exercises its
discretion to decide which returns to audit, what cases to pursue, and how
rigorously to pursue them, based on political considerations.107 Political
allies might be protected from scrutiny,108 while political enemies might be
information” and severely limits the president’s ability to access tax return information.
Mazza, supra note 4, at 1094.
105. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provided that willful unauthorized disclosure could be
punishable as a felony by a maximum fine of $5,000 and a maximum prison sentence of five
years. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7213(a) (West
2002)). Additionally, an officer or employee of the United States convicted of such offense
“shall be dismissed from office.” Id. (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7213(a)(1) (West
2002)). In contrast, the prior version of section 7213 treated such disclosure as a
misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum fine of $1,000 and a maximum prison sentence of
one year. I.R.C. § 7213(a) (1970), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7213(a)). In addition, Congress has
authorized taxpayers to bring civil actions for damages against the United States if an officer
or employee of the United States made an unauthorized disclosure about an individual
taxpayer knowingly or negligently. I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1) (West 2002). Section 7431
authorizes damages of the greater of $1,000 for each act of unauthorized disclosure or the
sum of actual damages plus punitive damages (which can be awarded in cases of willful
disclosure or gross negligence). I.R.C. § 7431(c) (West 2002).
106. See supra note 103 (discussing leaks of IRS information about political figures
George Wallace, Senator Joseph Montoya, and Lawrence O’Brien).
107. See George Lardner, Jr., Nixon Sought ‘Ruthless’ Chief to ‘Do What He’s Told’ at
IRS; Tape Includes Mention of Pursuing Enemies, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1997, at A1
(describing how John Dean, the White House counsel under President Nixon, had requested
that newly-appointed IRS Commissioner Walters audit taxpayers on Nixon’s “enemies
list”). Nixon had complained that there had been a probing audit of his own tax return in
1963, initiated by the Kennedy Administration. Id. According to the Washington Post,
Commissioner Johnnie Walters, with the backing of Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz,
refused the request transmitted by Dean and later handed over the “enemies list” to
congressional investigators. Id.; see also BURNHAM, supra note 103, at 300-01 (reporting
that in December 1972, after Senator Joseph Montoya of New Mexico had announced
hearings to air citizens’ complaints against the IRS, the director of the IRS district in New
Mexico began an investigation of the Senator’s tax files); Mazza, supra note 4, at 1094
n.137 (noting that “[c]laims that the executive branch caused the IRS to initiate politically
motivated audits resurfaced in the wake of President Clinton’s impeachment”) (citing
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 317 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2003)); supra note 103 (discussing
the subsequent investigation of Senator Montoya). Congress has prohibited the executive
branch from asking that the IRS initiate or terminate an investigation. I.R.C. § 7217 (West
2002) (prohibiting the President, Vice President, and certain executive branch employees
from directly or indirectly requesting that the IRS “conduct or terminate an audit or other
investigation of any particular taxpayer with respect to the tax liability of such taxpayer”).
108. David Burnham describes how former President Eisenhower intervened in the
1960s with Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson to prevent the Justice
Department’s prosecution of Sherman Adams, a former White House Chief of Staff under
Eisenhower. See BURNHAM, supra note 103, at 246-47. Burnham explains that Kennedy
and Johnson “sought psychological advantage over a former president by persuading the
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subjected to greater than usual scrutiny.109 These political allies might end
up paying less tax than owed and be free from the annoyance of audits;
political enemies might end up undergoing a detailed, intrusive audit and
having to pay every penny of tax that they owe (even while knowing that
most taxpayers do not). Conceivably, a political enemy could end up
paying even more than he actually owes, after deciding that it is too
embarrassing or politically damaging to bring the matter to Tax Court, an
institution which publicly disseminates opinions.110 When the IRS brings a
criminal case against a taxpayer based on political motives, even if the
charges are not sustained in court, the taxpayer is put through a terrible and
expensive ordeal.111
In 1998, Congress adopted an explicit “prohibition on executive branch
influence over taxpayer audits and other investigations.” It prescribed
criminal penalties for White House officials willfully making improper
requests to the IRS and for IRS employees failing to report improper
requests to the Treasury Inspector General.112 Such legislation will not
necessarily eliminate this abuse under the income tax. However, if such
political abuses are a concern under the income tax, it is hard to see that
such concern would disappear under the flat tax. Individuals would still be
required to file personal tax returns showing wages and pension payments,
and, if engaged in business, a business tax return. (Non-profits would also
IRS not to prosecute [Eisenhower’s] former assistant.” Id.
109. See supra notes 103, 107 (providing relatively recent examples of executive branch
officials using the IRS to exert political pressure on political enemies). Burnham recounts
how Eleanor Roosevelt sent a note to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau suggesting an
investigation of whether Cornell University improperly provided funds to conservative
newspaper publisher Frank Gannett, who was also the vice chairman of the Republican
National Committee. BURNHAM, supra note 103, at 236-38. Because Gannett was also the
chairman of the executive committee of the Board of trustees of Cornell, this allegation was
pertinent to Cornell’s tax exemption. Id. The subsequent investigation did not result in any
IRS challenge to Cornell’s tax exemption. Id. Burnham describes another occasion, in
which Morgenthau demanded that the IRS criminal division bring criminal tax charges
against Andrew Mellon, a former Republican secretary of the treasury. Id. at 229-30. The
government alleged that Mellon owed over a million dollars in additional taxes as a result of
claiming illegitimate stock losses. Id. at 230. The grand jury, however, did not indict him,
and in a subsequent civil case, most of the IRS claims were rejected. Id. Morgenthau also
ordered an investigation of Huey Long and his associates; however, this investigation “los[t]
momentum” with Long’s assassination. Id. at 234.
110. On the other hand, the taxpayer may wish to bring to public attention the political
motivation for the IRS action.
111. See BURNHAM, supra note 103, at 240-43 (describing the prosecution on criminal
tax evasion charges of Reuben G. Lenske, a lawyer suspected by local law enforcement
officials of being “politically suspicious”). Lenske’s conviction was overturned by the court
of appeals, and one of the appellate judges wrote a separate opinion referring to the
prosecution as “a witch-hunt, a crusade by the key agent of the United States in this
prosecution, to rid our country of unorthodox thinkers . . . by using federal income tax
laws.” Id. at 241. A total of four years passed between the original indictment and Lenske’s
acquittal. Id. at 240.
112. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, § 1105(a), 112 Stat. 685, 711 (1998) (adding I.R.C. § 7217).
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continue to have dealings with the IRS,113 and these could potentially be
politically influenced).114 In all, there would continue to be a great deal of
room for the IRS to exercise discretion with respect to auditing returns or
pursuing deficiencies or criminal investigations, and this discretion could
still be exercised for political reasons.
d.

Use of information by someone already familiar with taxpayer

People who have some familiarity with the taxpayer (either through
direct dealings with the taxpayer or because the taxpayer is well-known)
may be interested in the financial information that the taxpayer provided to
the IRS. They may seek this information in order to make decisions
regarding their dealings with the taxpayer, in an effort to formulate an
opinion of the taxpayer, or out of pure curiosity. Because of the power of
computers and database search capabilities,115 IRS employees may be in a
position to search for information about particular individuals in whom
they have an interest. Moreover, with the cooperation of corrupt IRS
employees or if computer security is not adequate, people outside the IRS
could also browse IRS databases for information about particular
113. Under the Hall-Rabushka proposal, nonprofit organizations would be exempt from
the business tax, except with respect to income from an actual business. See HALL &
RABUSHKA, supra note 9, at 126. Presumably, such organizations would still need to meet
IRS requirements to obtain and maintain exempt status, as under current law. For the
treatment of nonprofits under other proposals, see Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform—
Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687, 743 (1999). Brody notes that
The Armey-Shelby Flat Tax proposal would exempt governments and nonprofits
from the business tax, except for their unrelated business activities. However, the
Flat Tax would limit the nonprofit exemption to charities, while imposing business
taxes on transfers of property or the provision of services by all other nonprofits,
“even if such activities are substantially related to what historically has been
considered to be the exempt purposes of these organizations.”
Id. at 743 (footnotes omitted).
114. See BURNHAM, supra note 103, at 259-60 (describing how the IRS questioned the
exempt status of the North American Congress on Latin America, an organization that
frequently criticized the Reagan administration’s policies); see also id. at 261 (discussing
the IRS Commissioner’s decision in 1948 to withdraw tax exemptions for certain small
organizations considered to be “subversive,” such as the National Council of AmericanSoviet Friendship). Burnham also describes the IRS’s investigation of the National Council
of Churches during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Id. at 264-67. Burnham argues
that the investigation was triggered by the IRS’s opposition to the Council’s liberal views on
race, rather than tax law concerns. Id. at 267; see also id. at 270-73 (describing the
Kennedy administration’s push for IRS investigations of “extremist organizations,”
particularly Kennedy’s right-wing political enemies, as a result of which the IRS
recommended revocation of the exempt status of H.L. Hunt’s Life-Line Foundation and of
Dr. Fred Schwarz’s Christian Anti-Communist Crusade). The intervention by political
officials in the Nixon administration resulted in IRS rejection of the exemption application
of the Center for Corporate Responsibility, in 1973, which was overturned by a federal
judge, who cited “political intervention” and a “political atmosphere generated by the White
House in the Internal Revenue Service.” Id. at 284-85.
115. See Bell, Wiretapping’s Fruits, supra note 44, at 25 (stating that electronic recordkeeping “removes the ‘practical obscurity’ of records that are ‘available’ but difficult to
acquire and compile” and thus implicates privacy concerns) (footnote omitted).
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taxpayers.
At the same time, there are myriad reasons why an individual taxpayer
might wish to keep investment information concealed from particular
individuals or categories of people. Some of these reasons are based on the
individual’s desire to conceal the amount of his wealth (whether low or
high). In our society, lack of wealth is often considered a disadvantage or
even a sign of lesser moral worth.116 Therefore, many individuals may
wish to hide information about a low amount of wealth in order to maintain
a good reputation with friends, family, acquaintances, potential business
associates, potential creditors, or potential dates. Some individuals may
feel shame or embarrassment about their relative poverty; others might
seek to avoid unsolicited advice about ways to improve their financial
wellbeing.
There are also situations in which being perceived as wealthy may be a
disadvantage, and an individual would seek to hide his wealth.117 An
individual’s wealth may make his employer reluctant to raise his salary. A
wealthy individual may receive undesired requests for gifts or loans from
family and friends, or requests for charitable contributions. An individual
may live below his means and seek to hide his wealth from his children in
an effort to develop their self-reliance and adherence to a modest life style.
An individual may seek to hide his wealth from a prospective marriage
partner to assure himself that the decision to marry him is based on other
factors. Finally, an individual may seek to hide his wealth to avoid having
his friends who have lesser wealth feel uncomfortable around him,118 to
avoid appearing boastful, or to foster a reputation for favoring “the little
guy.”119
116. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (describing how income levels can
shape people’s opinions of themselves and of others).
117. See Slevin v. City of N.Y., 551 F. Supp. 917, 931-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, Barry v. City of N.Y., 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing various
reasons for concealing financial information, such as the wish to structure one’s family life
without regard to one’s wealth; wanting to keep one’s finances secret from one’s spouse,
especially in a relationship where both spouses have independent incomes; or wanting to
avoid salespeople, investment seekers, and other commercial interests that target individuals
with financial means).
118. See Terri Cullen, Fiscally Fit: Lasting Friendships Can Be Tough, WSJ.COM
(Sept. 16, 2004) (noting that friends and neighbors are already able to compare each other
on the basis of their consumption habits) (on file with the American University Law
Review).
119. When Ralph Nader revealed details about his finances for the first time in 2000
(immediately prior to receiving a presidential nomination by the Green Party), the press
focused on the apparent inconsistency between his wealth and his political positions. See,
e.g., Advocate Rails Against Wealth, Is Worth Millions, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 19, 2000,
at A4 (suggesting that Nader’s personal status as a multi-millionaire did not correlate with
his outspoken political opposition to the concentration of America’s wealth in corporate
hands); Mike Allen, Nader’s Worth at $3.8 Million; Green Party Hopeful Invested Heavily
in Tech, WASH. POST, June 18, 2000, at A1 (noting that “[a]fter 35 years of bashing big
business, rumpled Ralph Nader is worth at least $3.8 million and is heavily invested in
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An individual may also have reasons for hiding particular investments
from others with whom he has dealings or who know him by reputation.
Some investments may be perceived as involving a conflict of interest
(even when not violating any formal prohibition, such as might apply to a
government official).120 For example, a doctor may not want his patients to
know that he owns stock in a particular pharmaceutical company. Some
investments may be perceived as inconsistent with the political or social
views that an individual displays, or with the views of his friends or
colleagues. For example, an environmental activist may not want his
friends or supporters to know that he owns stock in a company that shows
disregard for the environment.121 One may wish to conceal one’s
ownership of stock in a casino from a religious relative who believes that
gambling is sinful. Alternatively, a taxpayer may want to avoid having his
family or associates examine the wisdom of his investment strategy. For
example, an individual may not want to reveal a purchase of Enron stock
shortly before it lost most of its value. A person may want to avoid giving
family members the opportunity to criticize an investment portfolio for lack
of diversity or for excessive emphasis on investments in emerging markets.
Overall, these reasons for hiding information about one’s investments
seem legitimate and worthy of protection (even if they do not rise to the
same level as the desire to avoid theft, kidnapping, or political dirty tricks).
Moreover, it is difficult to argue that being an IRS employee should give
someone a special license to ferret out others= secrets of this sort.
Therefore, the development of reliable safeguards against browsing is
highly desirable.
Throughout the 1990s Congress received considerable evidence that
some IRS employees were improperly browsing taxpayer=s records.122 In
1997, Congress enacted legislation that made unauthorized inspection of a
tax return by an IRS employee a criminal offense, if willful, and also

technology stocks”); Nader Defends Wealth, Portfolio of Tech Stocks, CHI. TRIB., June 19,
2000, at 10 (noting that “Nader, a longtime consumer advocate and critic of corporate
America, is worth millions thanks to investments in high-tech companies”).
120. Under 18 U.S.C. § 208, an officer or employee of the executive branch is prohibited
from participating personally and substantially in an official capacity in any particular
matter in which, to the employee’s knowledge, he or any other person whose interests are
imputed to him under this statute has a financial interest.
121. When Ralph Nader was questioned by reporters about his investments in
technology stocks in 2000, he pointed out that his stock investments were in “the most
neutral-type companies,” ones that were not monopolistic and did not “produce land mines,
napalm, [or] weapons.” He also said that he shunned tax shelters, including municipal
bonds. Allen, supra note 119, at A1.
122. See Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information with Other Countries:
Should Tax Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 579, 616-17 (2004)
(describing how unauthorized browsing by IRS employees led to a Senate Committee
hearing and providing various examples of this practice).
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authorized a suit for civil damages.123 This legislation apparently has not
put an end to employee browsing.124 Nor is the security of IRS computers
sufficient to preclude entirely the possibility of browsing by nonemployees. However, there appears to be no reason that, in the long term,
improvements in training of IRS employees, and new methods of
prevention and detection in IRS computers125 could not minimize the extent
of this browsing.
Such improvements in safeguards against improper browsing would
seem to be a better solution than removing investment information from the
hands of the IRS through the adoption of a flat tax. Even under the flat tax,
the IRS would have a considerable amount of personal information about
taxpayers that might be of interest to potential browsers and that taxpayers
would have legitimate reasons for wishing to conceal. This would include
information about one’s dependents and filing status, detailed information
about one’s salary, retirement income, and the income and expenses of

123. See Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-35, 111 Stat. 1104
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7213A (West 2002)) (imposing a criminal penalty
consisting of a fine not to exceed $1,000 or a prison term of up to one year, or both). The
Act also provided civil damages for “unauthorized inspection of returns and return
information.” Pub. L. No. 105-35 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7431). In addition, the
changes require the IRS to notify a taxpayer if an employee is criminally charged with
unauthorized inspection of the taxpayer’s return. Id.
124. In the two years following the statute’s enactment, the Treasury substantiated 198
cases of unauthorized browsing. 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 174-75. According to
the report, these cases involved the following kinds of employees: “auditors and tax
examiners (77), collection (48), Taxpayer service (31), clerical (19), Criminal Investigation
Division (3), Management (6), Professional/Technical (2) and other (12).” Id. at 175; see
also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONFIDENTIALITY OF TAX DATA: IRS’
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAXPAYER BROWSING PROTECTION ACT (1999) (analyzing the
Office of Chief Inspector’s investigations of instances of unauthorized access to IRS data),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archiv
e/1999/gg99043.pdf.
125. See 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 178 (citing the IRS as having acknowledged
in 2000 that, in the short-term, its computer systems are not capable of modification to
prevent and promptly detect unauthorized browsing). See also Memorandum from Pamela
J. Gardiner, Deputy Inspector General for Audit, Dep’t. of the Treasury, July 8, 2005, in
DEP’T. OF TREASURY, MANAGERS AND SYSTEM ADMINISTRATORS NEED TO LIMIT
EMPLOYEES’ ACCESS TO COMPUTER SYSTEMS,
available at 2005 TNT 136-55
(recommending that the IRS configure computer systems to automatically disable users’
accounts after fourty-five days of inactivity to prevent access by employees who leave the
IRS or have changed job responsibilities); Memorandum from Pamela J. Gardiner, Deputy
Inspector General for Audit, Dep’t. of the Treasury, March 15, 2005, in DEP’T. OF
TREASURY, WHILE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, MANAGERS AND EMPLOYEES ARE STILL
SUSCEPTIBLE TO SOCIAL ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES, available at 2005 TNT 52-27
(recommending that IRS continue reminding employees of how hackers might seek to get
access to passwords); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION SECURITY:
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE NEEDS TO REMEDY SERIOUS WEAKNESSES OVER TAXPAYER
AND BANK SECRECY ACT DATA, APRIL 2005, REPORT TO THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
available at 2005 TNT 73-42 (concluding that “[u]ntil IRS fully implements a
comprehensive agencywide security program, its facilities, computing resources and [data]
will remain vulnerable”).
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one’s business.126 This could also include information uncovered in an
audit and information about the nature of one’s interactions with the IRS.
Under the flat tax, taxpayer concerns would continue to justify vigorous
action to prevent unauthorized browsing.
3.

Authorized disclosures to other government agencies
Investment information obtained by the IRS may be disseminated much
more widely than thus far indicated, because Congress has authorized a
number of other federal and state agencies to receive tax return
information127 for purposes other than federal tax administration.128
Pursuant to section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS may make
a disclosure to state tax officials for purposes of state tax administration;129
to congressional committees and the Government Accounting Office
(“GAO”) in certain cases;130 to a federal, state, or local agency
administering various welfare or government assistance programs;131 to the
U.S. Customs Service;132 to federal, state, and local child support
enforcement agencies;133 and to certain federal officials for use in non taxrelated criminal investigations.134 As a result, in addition to IRS
126. One might make the argument that business and employment activities are by their
very nature open to public view and, hence, disclosure of information about such activities
should not be feared. However, some employment, consulting, and business activity can be
conducted in the privacy of one’s home using nothing more than a telephone, fax machine,
and computer. Moreover, even if the nature of the activity is not hidden, the individual in
such a situation still has an interest in avoiding disclosure of detailed information regarding
salary, professional fees and expenses, business profits, and pension payments.
127. The Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation and the Department of the
Treasury each carried out a thorough review of these disclosure rules at Congress’s request.
See 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-55 (providing a thorough description of each of
these authorized disclosures and their limitations); 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 89,
at 42-94 (analyzing each of the disclosure authorizations and providing recommendations
for further changes).
128. See supra note 3 (tracing Congress’s changing position towards IRS disclosures to
other governmental entities).
129. I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1) (West 2002).
130. I.R.C. § 6103(f), (i)(8) (West 2002).
131. See I.R.C. § 6103(l)(7) (West 2002) (specifying that this information is to be used
only for the purpose of determining eligibility or the correct amount of benefits).
132. I.R.C. § 6103(l)(14) (West 2002).
133. I.R.C. § 6103(l)(6) (West 2002).
134. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1), (2), (3), (5), (7) (West 2002). In addition, some federal and
state agencies require individuals to provide a copy of the federal income tax return in
certain circumstances. See William J. Turnier, PAYE as an Alternative to an Alternative
Tax System, 23 VA. TAX REV. 205, 210 (2003-2004) (noting that “[t]he individual income
tax return has taken on a significant role as an informal provider of financial information
about individuals in a variety of circumstances”). Turnier cites the following examples: (1)
student loan applicants must file copies of their past tax returns as well as their parents’ past
tax returns; (2) divorce lawyers routinely obtain copies of tax returns to assess the financial
status of the parties, and judges often use them to assess a party’s ability to provide alimony
and child support; (3) banks regularly seek copies of past tax returns to make credit
decisions; and (4) social service providers often request past tax returns to determine
whether an applicant satisfies the agency’s need-based criteria. Id. at 210-11; see also
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO
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employees, a vast number of people have access to taxpayers’ investment
information.135
This increased access to IRS information raises a number of concerns.
Some might argue that, despite the safeguards established by Congress,136
such widespread disclosure cannot be adequately policed for leakage to
unauthorized users.137 Others may argue that there is something inherently
objectionable in the practice of allowing information that was obtained by
the government for one purpose to be used for another unrelated
governmental purpose, even if there is advance warning to the taxpayer.138
Finally, some have warned that taxpayers will be less forthcoming in
providing information to the IRS139 if they believe the information will be
disclosed to other government agencies.140
But none of these concerns (even if accepted as valid) necessarily
CONGRESS 249 (2003) (noting that it has become customary for taxpayers applying for and
obtaining mortgage loans to sign a Form 4506 (Request for Copy or Transcript of Tax
Form) during the closing process), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/nta_2003_annual_update_mcw_1-15-042.pdf; 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 89, at
69-78 (providing a detailed discussion of how tax return information is legitimately gained
by third parties pursuant to taxpayer consent and noting that as technology advances, the
number of third-party requests for taxpayer consents will only increase).
135. However, in a case where a taxpayer is simply required to provide a copy of Form
1040, a copy may be filed that does not correspond to the version of the return that was filed
with the IRS. See supra note 134 (describing situations in which a taxpayer may be
required to provide tax return information to an entity other than the IRS, such as a bank or
an attorney).
136. See I.R.C. § 6103(p)(4), (5), (6) (West 2002).
137. See, e.g., IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED, supra note 79, at 9-18 (noting that a review
of IRS safeguard procedures showed that these safeguards had not been adequately
implemented).
138. See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Information about Individuals in the Hands of
Government: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 455, 466 (1995) (examining whether information obtained by the government
for a specific purpose should be disclosed to other government agencies for a different
purpose without the individual’s consent). BeVier notes that, on the other hand, the public’s
interest in allowing disclosure by one agency to another can be quite high. Id. at 476.
BeVier states that “vis-à-vis the government generally, and its demands that citizens supply
it with personal information in connection with its regulatory, welfare, revenue-raising, or
crime-fighting agenda, an individual has very little in the way of a ‘privacy interest’ to be
waived.” Id.
139. This argument may have less relevance for information provided to the IRS through
Form 1099 reporting because individuals have limited options for avoiding such reporting.
140. See, e.g., PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-7 (stating that
“confidentiality of tax returns and related information is an essential element of preserving
the effectiveness of the tax system in this country . . . [in] that widespread use of the
information a taxpayer provides to the [IRS] . . . cannot help but diminish the taxpayer=s
disposition to cooperate with the IRS voluntarily”); see also 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra
note 89, at 34 (stating that “[o]vertly tying tax reporting to needs-based government benefits
may lead some individuals to underreport their income in order to qualify for such
benefits . . . . Conversely, overtly tying tax reporting to the ability to qualify for loans,
credit, etc., may lead some individuals to overreport their income . . . . In addition to these
specific effects on tax compliance, there is the more general issue of confidence in the tax
system”). But see Mazza, supra note 4, at 1070-73 (stating that the link between
confidentiality and taxpayer compliance has not been directly proven).
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provide support for the adoption of a flat tax in order to reduce the amount
of investment information in the hands of the IRS and, thus, available for
disclosure to other agencies. A more direct response to these concerns
would be for Congress to remove authorization for all or some of the
disclosures that the IRS is allowed to make141 to other agencies, or to
require greater safeguards as a precondition for making such disclosures.
The latter approach might be criticized as unrealistic.
Professor Peter Swire suggests that once the government incurs the costs
of acquiring information for one purpose (e.g., enforcing the income tax), it
becomes inefficient and therefore politically difficult to prevent its use for
other legitimate government purposes (e.g., determining eligibility for
social security benefits). He feels that we may fall down a “slippery slope”
leading to the “complete loss of privacy of highly personal information . . .
[so that] tax returns might become essentially public documents.”142 But,
as Swire recognizes, Congress has not actually allowed the IRS to disclose
tax return information freely to all government agencies.143 Moreover, the
boundaries that Congress established between authorized and unauthorized
disclosures have remained relatively stable since 1976.144 It appears,
141. See supra notes 127-134 and accompanying text (noting that the IRS may disclose
information to certain government entities pursuant to section 6103 of the Internal Revenue
Code).
142. Swire, supra note 59, at 498. Swire discusses the fact that once the initial costs of
building the database and infrastructure have been incurred, “then additional uses may be
cost-justified that would otherwise not have been.” Id. at 497. As he explains, since “costs
have already been incurred in the tax system to gather and organize . . . tax return data . . .
there is a low incremental expense to transfer the data to other federal agencies and perhaps
to state and local welfare and other agencies.” Id. at 498. Therefore, “an efficiency
argument can . . . be made that additional uses of data, such as protecting against welfare
fraud, should be authorized where the costs of gathering and organizing the comprehensive
tax data would not have been justified solely to protect against welfare fraud.” Id. He
points out that “[i]n recognition of this problem, there are federal laws [i.e., section 6103]
restricting use of tax returns for other purposes.” Id. He further explains that “[i]f the
government . . . already has fifteen uses for a category of data, it may be impossible
politically to stop the sixteenth or seventeenth uses, even where those additional uses would
never have been approved at the time the data collection system was first instituted.” Id. at
499.
143. See id. at 498 (noting that specific restrictions exist to limit the government’s use of
tax returns and return information).
144. See 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 89, at 3 (stating that although the
disclosure laws have been amended since the implementation of the Tax Reform Act of
1976, the Act’s basic statutory scheme remains in force today). However, the Treasury
Report also noted the addition of exceptions to section 6103 over the years since the Act’s
enactment, noting that questions have arisen about whether the balance Congress intended
to strike through section 6103 has been eroded. Id. at 67. For example, since the 1976 Act,
new paragraphs (7) through (18) have been added to I.R.C. § 6103(l), a provision governing
“disclosure of returns and return information for purposes other than tax administration.”
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13402(a), 107 Stat. 312, 563-64 (1993) (adding ¶ (13)); Pub.
L. No. 103-182, § 522(a), 107 Stat. 2057, 2161 (1993) (adding ¶ (14)); Pub. L. No. 99-335,
§ 310(a), 100 Stat. 514, 607-08 (1986) (adding ¶ (12)); Pub. L. No. 98-369, §
2653(b)(3)(A), 98 Stat. 494, 1155 (1984) (adding ¶ (10)); Pub. L. No. 96-249, § 127(a)(1),
94 Stat. 357, 365 (1980) (adding ¶ (7)).
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therefore, that Congress is capable of making individualized determinations
of whether IRS disclosures to a particular governmental agency or unit for
a specific purpose are warranted.145
Moreover, privacy concerns raised by authorized IRS disclosures to
other government units under current law would not necessarily be
resolved by Congress’s adoption of a flat tax. Notwithstanding a repeal of
the federal income tax, federal and state governments might continue to
need information about an individual’s investment income. For example,
Congress would probably146 continue to require means-testing to determine
eligibility for participation in certain federal programs, and some state
governments might wish to continue to collect their revenue through an
income tax. If the Form 1099 reporting system for investment income were
no longer required for administering federal taxes, Congress might still
consider it necessary for these other purposes (whether administered by the
IRS or another federal body).147 In that case, there might be no change in
the broad dissemination of information about investment income to various
government agencies, and the potential for leakage would remain
unchanged.
Alternatively, if the Form 1099 reporting system for investment income
were abolished when a flat tax was adopted, particular federal agencies or
state governments148 requiring the information might simply rely on
145. See BeVier, supra note 138, at 503-04 (arguing that
the appropriate answer to each question of whether a particular unconsented-to use
ought to be permitted is highly context-specific. Proper resolution depends on a
multitude of variables including the purpose for which use or disclosure is desired
and the efficiency gains its use would generate; the extent to which non-disclosure
would permit the data subject to misrepresent herself to the recipient agency; the
purposes for which the information was originally collected; the kind of
information at issue (whether of a highly personal, intimate, or embarrassing
nature); the subjective or objectively reasonable expectations of the data subject
with respect to its subsequent use; and the unjustified adverse consequences that
might befall the individual if the information is used for a different purpose”
).
146. See Gene Steuerle, Taxing the Capital Income of Only the Poor and the Middle
Class, 107 TAX NOTES 239 (Apr. 11, 2005) (explaining that currently Congress provides for
a phasing out of benefits on the basis of income in many federal programs, such as food
stamps, Pell grants, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Medicaid, rental housing
vouchers, school lunch programs, child care vouchers, and supplemental security income).
Steuerle states that “advocates of consumption taxes never deal with how those various
‘income tax layers’ within spending programs would be handled.” But he concludes that
“[f]rom what I have seen of all consumption tax proposals to date . . . those proposals do not
change the income accounting required in all those other programs such as food stamps or
EITC, even though they may eliminate the income tax.” As a result, he argues, “all the
lower- and middle-income households who receive educational or work-related or child or
welfare or health benefits . . . would need to fill out income tax forms for these other
programs, because the IRS form no longer would be available to be sent as a substitute.” Id.
147. See Strauss, supra note 33, at 419-21 (pointing out the difficulties that a state
government might have in establishing its own information reporting program).
148. See Roin, supra note 9, at 333 (noting, as one of the ramifications of replacing the
income tax with a value-added tax (“VAT”), that currently the state tax authorities “obtain
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mandatory reporting by individuals, perhaps supplemented by selective
audits. This would not seem to offer any significant advantages in terms of
privacy.
Honest individuals would continue to provide complete
information about their investments to the requesting government agency;
some unlucky individuals would be subjected to the intrusiveness of a
detailed audit of their finances; and dishonest, risk-taking individuals
would conceal information about their investment income149 at the expense
of other citizens. In conclusion, the flat tax does not seem to offer
protection against any harm that might result when federal agencies or state
governments seek information about an individual=s investment income.
CONCLUSION
I have sought to demonstrate that certain privacy concerns under the
current income tax system may not be as serious as some suggest, and that
other privacy concerns will continue even under the flat tax. I have argued
that the manner in which the IRS generally obtains information about
investment income (Form 1040 or Form 1099) is not particularly
intrusive.150 I have also argued that the use of this information solely by
the IRS and solely for administration of the income tax does not in itself
cause serious harm for taxpayers (other than their being required to pay
their share of the income tax).151
When information is misused by IRS officials or others, there is a
potential for serious harm, and such misuse may not be able to be
completely eradicated. However, it does not appear that information held
by the IRS contributes significantly to the crimes of theft, identity theft, or
kidnapping, or to annoying solicitations for investment services or
charitable contributions. Moreover, the harms stemming from the use of
taxpayer information for political purposes or from the browsing of
taxpayer information by IRS employees or others would seem to be a
considerable amounts of information from federal authorities on the auditing side,
information generated by the federal government in the course of monitoring and auditing
the implementation of the federal income tax,” such as, “information gleaned from its much
more extensive system for matching information returns to individual and corporate
returns”). If the federal income tax is repealed, Roin concludes that state tax systems will
become more costly to administer. Id.
149. See BeVier, supra note 138, at 470-72 (arguing that it is not desirable for citizens to
“mislead” the government as to facts that are relevant to application of its regulatory
programs, as determined by Congress through legitimate processes); see also Allen, supra
note 42, at 872 (noting that while public benefits such as “[w]elfare, Social Security,
disaster relief, [and] student loans” should be available, “moral accountability in the form of
personal financial disclosures” should be required in order to obtain these benefits).
150. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (comparing mandatory information
reporting to police searches and surveillance).
151. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text (noting that actual scrutiny by an IRS
employee is rare and that even if such scrutiny occurs the IRS employee is a stranger and
has little personal interest in the taxpayer’s investment income).
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continuing concern under the flat tax, in that the IRS would continue to
have information regarding taxpayers’ wages, pensions, business income
and expenses, filing status, and dependents.
Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that the elimination of routine
reporting of investment income under the flat tax would result in there
being less information about taxpayers in the hands of the IRS, and thus
less information vulnerable to potential leakage or abuse. Peter Swire has
suggested that information that is not placed in a government Avault@ is not
at risk of Aleaking@ from the vault.152
In light of this, why not simply accept the argument that adopting a flat
tax would somewhat improve the privacy of American taxpayers? This
argument glosses over the fact that any new privacy benefits to be obtained
would be distributed very unequally among taxpayers.153 As others have
pointed out, the only significant investment assets of most taxpayers are
their residences, their pensions, and their life insurance reserves.154 Since
most taxpayers lack any significant amount of dividends, interest, or capital
gains, the only increase in their privacy under the flat tax would be the
ability to keep secret from government their lack of significant investment
income. If the flat tax is promoted as a boon for privacy, such individuals
could justifiably feel that their privacy concerns are being taken less
seriously than the privacy concerns of taxpayers with significant
investment income.155 For the vast majority of taxpayers, the goal of
greater privacy with respect to the tax code would be better served by
strengthening safeguards against misuse of government information, rather
than by providing complete protection for information about investment
152. See Swire, supra note 59, at 478-79 (introducing the metaphor of our financial data
being in a “vault 600 feet down,” and “each use of data as a pipeline going from the vault to
the surface”). Swire argues that “[w]hen there are inadequate controls on data that leave the
vault, then one might have filters on flows into the vault.” Id. at 484.
153. See id. at 505-06 (noting that “[n]ew surveillance technologies may have
disproportionate impacts on different economic classes or racial or other groups”). For
example, Swire points out that electronic benefits transfers for food stamps “apply
predominantly to the poor and to minority groups that are disproportionately poor [while]
the rich, the well-educated, and the savvy may also have ways, unavailable to the poor, to
avoid or reduce government surveillance.” Id.; see also William J. Stuntz, The Distribution
of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1267 (1999) (arguing that
under the Fourth Amendment, “the kind of privacy protection citizens have vis-à-vis the
police is tied to the kind of privacy protection the same citizens have with one another [and
since t]hat kind of privacy can be bought . . . people with more money have more of it than
people who don’t”).
154. See Kurtz, supra note 9, at 166 (noting that the average taxpayer’s wealth primarily
consists of a home, life insurance, and interests in a pension plan and the social security
retirement system). Citing IRS statistics based on 1997 returns, Kurtz notes that out of the
5.8% of returns with adjusted gross income in excess of $100,000, “fewer than 6% . . .
reported over 67% of taxable interest, dividends and gains.” Id. at 168.
155. Cf. BOK, supra note 81, at 27 (arguing that “[w]hatever control over secrecy and
openness we conclude is legitimate for some individuals should, in the absence of special
considerations, be legitimate for all”).
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income alone.
Concerns about privacy should not play an important role in the debate
about the desirability of adopting a flat tax. Instead, the debate should focus
on considerations of fairness, administrability, and economic effects.
Regardless of the outcome of this debate, the government and the IRS will
continue to collect a great amount of information about Americans. We
will need to rely on the rules enacted by Congress, on the adherence to
these rules by the agency, and on continuing judicial scrutiny to prevent
abuses.

